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INTRODUCTION
Scope of Thesis.—The present thesis is an attempt
to present an interpretation of workmen's Compensation in
Connecticut with particular reference to tne principles of
economics involved and the legal machinery set up to give
the Connecticut Act practical effect.
in making this study the writer has attempted to do
considerably more than merely to discuss the provisions of
the Connecticut Compensation Law as construed in the text
of the Act as amended in 1931. The entire question of in-
dustrial accidents as well as the probable preventative mea-
sures against such occurrences are first set forth to show
the necessity for this type of legislation in every com-
munity making pretentions to civilization. While the enact-
ment of laws of tliis type are well-nigh universal now in all
communities other than primitive ones, and while such laws
are conducive to a more full measure of social justice in
the situations to which they apply than the earlier so-called
common law codes, and while the subject-matter of this thesis
is chiefly concerned with the necessity for, the history of,
and the proper functioning of such a law in the State of Con-
necticut, there is a somewhat extensive discussion of the
psychology of accident prevention in the first chapter, be-
cause the writer believes that the most eloquent pleas which
our industrial leaders can make to prove that their attitude
is a laudable one is to do all in their power to make indus-
trial accidents a thing of the past.
1

The attitude of the courts prior to the enactment
of a compensation lav/ in Connecticut and other states has
"been discussed in considerable detail, "because, unbelievable
as it may seem, the Compensation Act of Connecticut, as well
as the similar codes of other states, has grown out of this
body of American precedents not as a logical development,
but as an opposition movement fermented by the manifest in-
justice and inapplicability of the antiquated common law code.
In studying either the common law rules and decisions which
rather recently governed the courts in industrial accident
cases, it is neither feasible nor wise to study the rules and
precedents of one state without reference to the others; for,
in this branch of American law as well as in most divisions of
our law, while courts of one state are not bound by the de-
cisions arising in the courts of any other state, the judges
are inclined to study the rules and decisions of neighboring
states and are frequently influenced by such decisions, Eng-
lish decisions are also consulted and frequently cited in
authority. Therefore
,
any study of the Connecticut Compensa-
tion Act which was narrcvly exclusive of the experience sus-
tained in other states would be no study at all. Connecticut,
in a manner similar to that of many of our American states,
profited to a large degree from the experience of other states
in drafting its compensation code. The results of similar
legislation in Massachusetts were carefully considered; later,
after the enactment of a similar lav/ in Connecticut , the legis-
lators of California found unique provisions in the Connecticut
Act which were worth emulating.
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In tracing the history of the agitation for and
against the enactment of the Compensation Act in Connecticut
one finds that the various committees which vere appointed
to study the situation and proponents of the law consulted
European experience with this type of legislation. References
to the experience of Germany and Great Britain with compensa-
tion laws are so frequent in the work of writers on this sub-
ject as to make them seem almost commonplace. Governor's com-
mittees, experts testifying at public hearings, and other in-
terested parties asked or answered ouestions pertaining to for-
eign practice in regard to the question of the compensation for
industrial acoidents. It is, then, not out of place in a com-
parative study such as the present thesis to survey rapidly
the outstanding features of similar European codes and to com-
pare them with the provisions in the Connecticut Act; for, if
it had not "been for such an earlier and superior approach to
this important social problem on the part of European legis-
lators, neither Connecticut nor any other American state would
have had the temerity to enact such a code. We Americans are
supposed to "be a pioneering and progressive people, hut when
it comes to a consideration of social legislati on we are far
behind such small and far-flung political entities as Finland
or New Zealand. In social legislation we have been reactionary.
Our individualistic philosophy has been responsible for that.
"Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost" has
been the watchword of our over-grown frontier society; but now
when it is quite apoarent that the devil will not only take the
hindmost but the foremost as well, we are beginning to abandon

this particular type cf rugged individualism. It is, then,
not as an academic frill but as a necessary and integral part
of this study that the writer includes a section on European
experience. In his opinion there are yet lessons to "be learned.
General Treatises -- Their Value and Limitations ,—There
are not more than ten treatises covering the various phases of
the subject. In the course of preparing the present thesis
the writer found the following treatises valuable in the sense
that they furnish a prospective of the subject from various
angles which enabled him to make a more detailed study of the
Connecticut Compensation Act and to compare the provisions of
the Connecticut Act with similar laws in other states and
countries
i
1. FRA1JKEL and DAWSON, "Workingmen' s Insurance in Europe", 1910
2. I. M. RUBINOW, "Social Insurance", 1913
3. R. H. BLANCHARD
,
"Liability and Compensation Insurance", 1917
4. J. E. RHODES , "Workmen's Compensation", 1917
5. MTCHELBACHER and NIAL, "Workmen's Compensation Insurance", 1925
In addition to the general treatises listed above there
are a number of other works which contributed specialized informa-
tion indirectly related to Workmen's Corapensat ion> Certain
articles on labor relations in the American Economic Review,
chapters on negligence from Archer's "Lav/ of Torts" and the dis-
cussion on negligence in the Modern American Law series, extracts
from Roscoe Pound's "The Spirit of the Common Law", and a chapter
on safety psychology from Heinrich's "Industrial Accident Preven-
tion",

Special material applicable to conditions in Connecti-
cut alone was naturally the most difficult to obtain. The
most valuable data on Workmen f s Compensation in Connecticut
is contained in public documents, stenographic reports of
legislative committees, the text of the Y/orkmen's Compensa-
tion Act, tne bound reports on Connecticut Compensation De-
cisions, and the reports of the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors. Access to some of this material is obtained only
with difficulty, and all this material is legalistic and
. technically expressed. It has been the task of the writer
of the present thesis, therefore, to study this original
source material, to classify it according to a theory of
principles, and to fit it into its proper place in the his-
torical, social, and legal perspective which ne had formulated
from his study of general treatises and other material on the
subject not pertaining to Connecticut: The offices of the
several compensation commissioners of Connecticut, the State
Library at Hartford, Connecticut, and the Business Branch of
the Hartford Public Library. He is appreciative of the
courtesies extended to him by the various officials con-
nected with the above agencies.
The general treatises listed above are written for the
college student, the insurance official, or the general reader.
The attorney wishing a more extensive discussion of the finei1
points of law involved will find tne following legal treatises

6helpful and more applicable tc his needs: Boyd - "Workmen's
Compensation Act", Glass - "Workmen's Compensation Act",
Honnold - "On Workmen's Compensation".
It will he seen that v:hile there is considerable
material on the subject of Workmen's Compensation, the vast
majority of this material is general in its nature and there-
fore directly inapplicable to the conditions in any particular
community, where the adjustment of disputes arising out of
industrial accidents depends upon the statute enforced in
that particular community. The general treatises, then, can-
not be specific in their application; they can only be sug-
gestive of what form the legislation should take. In the
present study the writer has attempted to deduce a set of
principles from the text of the Connecticut Act, and at the
same time to compare the provisions in the Act with the similar
provisions in other compensation laws. He has attempted to
present a comparative and critical study as well as a factual
one. He has spared no one in his efforts to present the facts
as he found them in their garb of stark realism. If it be
thought that his attitude is hyper-critical of traditional
and hide -bound methods of dealing with the problems arising
out of the industrial accident, his answer is that an honest
effort to alleviate human suffering is adequate justification
for his or any other attitude I

PART ONE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
F
ORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

CHAPTER I
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TIES RISING TOLL OF ACCIDENTS
One naturally associates industrial development with
an increased standard of living, for a great increase in the
production of goods should result in an increase in real
wages to all engaged in the productive effort. While in
general tnis increased standard of living has aocompanied
the application of machinery and mass production methods to
industry, there has Deen an army of nerd workers to whom in-
dustrial progress has brought death and privation; for in-
dustrial expansion in company with other states of empire
building has taken its toll of lire and limb and nas left its
maimed, its widows, and its orpnans to utter their Ditter im-
precations upon the ruthless God of Progress.
Lack of Statistics. --The advancement of trade and com-
merce nas been purchased with millions of human lives sacri-
ficed in the countless wars brought on by commercial rivalry.
Frontiers also nave oeen extended at the cost of the lives of
a large proportion of those who attempted to carry the civili-
zation of their country to its outermost borders. These two
types of empire ouilaing are so familiar to us that they need
no illustration. Industrial expansion within the realm, how-
ever, while generally not looked upon in the same glamorous
light as that in which we view a great increase in foreign
commerce or the extension of a nation's boundaries, is never-
tneless as great a factor in the economic development of a
country. Loss of life and other casualties, though not nearly
7

8so readily associated with industrial expansion as with wars
of commerce, are, notwithstanding, a considerable factor in
any estimation of the price which must be paid for material
progress. Because casualties are so readily associated with
war, one finds statistics relaxing to the numbers killed,
wounded, and missing at hand. Figures for Industry's casu-
alties, nowever, particularly in the United States, are not
so available; yet the number of workmen killed, maimed or
otherwise injured, is appalling. In 1908 F. L. Hoffman, an
authoritative statistician in the field, estimated the number
of non-fatal accidents in the United States at 2,000,000. *
Professor Seager of Columbia University writing in 1910 **
quotes this figure of Mr. Hoffman's, and I. M. Rubinow in a
more extensive work published in 1913, *** although he gives
"about 2,700,000", as his estimate, also refers to Mr. Hoff-
man's figure of two million. With authorities writing on in-
dustrial accidents in the five-year period between 1908-1913
quoting a single estimate made at the beginning of that period,
there can be little doubt that no reliable statistics on the
number of industrial accidents in the United States existed.
One of the leading authorities on social insurance in
the United States writes: "Very few states collect any acci-
dent statistics at all, in still fewer of them are they properly
analyzed and studied, in none of them is the number of acci-
*H0FFMAN, F. L. , "Industrial Accidents", — Bulletin of the
U. S. Bureau of Labor, No. 78, September 1908.
**S2AGER, HENRY ROGERS, "Social Insurance", p. 28.
***RUBIN0..
,
I. M. , "Social Insurance", p. 55.

9dents reported at all near the actual number occurring, and
in each of them they are gathered and elaborated in a different
way". *
Necessity icr Statistics in Connecticut .—During a re-
cent interview with one of the five compensation commissioners
of the State of Connecticut, the writer queried this commis-
sioner regarding the matter of industrial accident statistics.
The commissioner, who is not only an except icnally well quali-
fied man for his office, "but who is also doing his utmost to
discharge the difficult and exacting duties coming within the
scope of his authority, readily admitted that no such source
of statistical information is available. This well-trained
and zealous public officer was well aware of the value of such
information. He had long been cognizant of the purpose to
which he might employ such statistics in enforcing the compen-
sation laws in his district, and in devising schemes calculated
to decrease the number of industrial accidents, but the state
legislature has shaved the appropriation allotted to workmen 1 s
compensation to such an extent that no provision can possibly
be made for the collection and tabulation of statistics. Short-
sighted and greedy industrialists, who can see no farther than
the net profit on their annual profit and loss statements, exert
their influence to nullify the effects of an elaborate and well-
drafted compensation code. Their avariciousness is exceeded
only by their stupidity, however, for this alert commissioner
is well aware that the most effective remedy for social losses
due to industrial accidents is the devising of preventive mea-
sures which in lowering the casualties would automatically re-
duce the insurance premiums which many of the employers so re-
* RUBIHOW, I. M.
,
"Social Insurance", p. 84
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sentfully and reluctantly pay.
Statistics and the Prevention of Accid
e
nts. --The pre-
vention of industrial accidents with their attendant individ-
ual suffering and social consequences rather than the enforce-
ment of compensation laws should be the goal of social legis-
lators of the future. In the State of Connecticut this phase
of the industrial accident problem would be handled best by
providing each of the five district commissioners with the
necessary statistical assistance to carry cut detailed studies
inquiring into the cause of industrial accidents. In the course
of his daily work the commissioner acting in the capacity of
impartial referee on a claim made by an employee against his
employer comes in contact with a sufficient amount of the de-
tailed background out of which the accident arose to enable
him to intelligently ascertain its cause. The commissioners
inevitably accumulate a wealth of data related to the environ-
ment of the worker both on the Job and outside. They are im-
measureably more competent to direct the research involved in
a study of accident prevention than any other agency, but they
have neither the time nor the energy to undertake the detailed
work which would be involved after they have served both em-
ployer and employee as arbitrator and mediator.
Psychology and Accident Prevention.—Corporations en-
gaged in transportation, however, have successfully conducted
research of the type indicated. Their unsuccessful participa-
tion in a legal tilt with the legal representatives of injured
commuters and the subsequent effect upon their income state-
ment, rather than humanitarian motives, or feelings of personal
sympathy for injured employees, no doubt, accounts for their
scientific approach to the problem. But irrespective of their
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approach, whether it he halance sheet or otherwise, if the
effect is to alleviate human suffering, or hotter still, make
its occurrence less frequent, future generations may feel grate-
ful. Perhaps it was this antipathy to transportation companies
on the part of juries which resulted in the verj- thorough and
scholarly study carried out at the instigation of the Boston
Elevated Railway in 1927.
The Boston Elevated Railway study referred to was under-
taken in cooperation with the Personnel Research Federation.
One of the main findings of this research was to the effect
-that all collisions were attributable to eighty-five per cent
of the operators, of electric cars and buses, fifteen per cent
of this group of employees having a spotless record in this
respect. It was further found that while an average of 2.3
collisions might be attributed to each member of this accident-
sustaining group, upon closer study of the records of the per-
sonnel involved a special group of fifteen per cent of the total
driving personnel sustained an average of 8.2 collisions each.
H. W. Heinrich, Assistant Superintendent of the Engineering
and Inspection Division of the Travelers Insurance Company of
Hartford, Connecticut, commenting on this study says: "Basic
causes of accident proneness were determined. In some cases
these were medical, in some attitudinal, and in others lack
of information and training. Treatment was devised to corres-
pond to individual conditions. Assistance, instruction, and
advice were given to compensate or to correct lack of abilities,
tendencies, and deficiencies. It was found that only a rela-
tively small proportion of deficiencies were matters of unal-
terable native endowment". *
* HEINi-ilCH , H. W . , "Industrial Accident Prevention", p. 134
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The Boston Elevated Railway study was distinctly psy-
chological in its approach. It will, however, he readily seen
that studies similar to this one are "by their very nature long,
painstaking, and expensive undertakings. Such studies, more-
over, are practically limited to groups of employees engaged
in work of a similar and standardized character. Heinrich
lists the following types of employees as the particular in-
dividuals to whom this kind of psychological research is most
applicable: taxicab and bus drivers, motormen of trolley cars,
locomotive engineers, salesmen, meter readers, collectors,
•coal miners, and workmen performing the great variety of com-
mon machine and hand operations in the industries which re-
quire one employee to perform work O" practically the same
kind and under the same circumstances as that done by many
other workers.
It is the opinion of Heinrich that although psychology
in accident prevention is a fundamental of great importance,
industry in general has not progressed sufficiently to adopt
the psychological approach. He considers the following to be
the three logical steps in accident prevention:
"Step 1. Guarding and elimination of machine and physical
hazards without use of cause -analysis.
Step 2. Selection of remedies "based on practical cause-
analysis that stops at the selection of the first real proxi-
mate and most easily prevented cause (such procedure is advo-
cated in this bock) and considers psychology when results are
not produced by simpler analysis.
Step 3. Selection of remedies based on psychological
analysis of underlying causes".
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"Industry in general", he concludes, "has not yet
progressed "beyond the first step. The ideal situation is one
wherein all three steps are taken". *
V
:
e must agree with this writer in his conclusion that
hy applying psychological methods to research in accident pre-
vention industry will more nearly approach the ideal in this
laudable work, this leaving little for the critics of our in-
dustrial organization to complain of and freeing legislators
to a great extent from the necessity of enacting laws which at
best are poor substitutes for the lives and limbs of the victims
of industrial tragedies.
HEINF.ICH, E. W.
,
"Industrial Accident Prevention", p. 128

CHAPTER II
INADEQUACY OF COTTON LAW REMEDIES
Despite the alleged flexibility of the common lav;, an
attribute which writers in the field of jurisprudence point to
with no small amount of professional pride, that flexibility
has proven to be more a myth than a fact in the face of revolu-
tionary industrial changes. The application of science and
inventive genius to industry has wrought such colossal changes
in the material environment which surrounds the workmen that
not only has he become mentally confused and physically en-
dangered but the jurists in their efforts to adapt an obsolete
legal system to these unforeseen conditions have met with con-
fusion equally as greet, although not as threatening to their
own physical well-being. Their attempts to apply the legal
logic of a by-gone era to the complex cases erected by modern
industrialism have been pitiful. More pitiful, however, have
been the results of this musty and legalistic rationalizing to
the literally keen and quick -cutting situations in which in-
jured workmen became pawns in a game of chess played by the
common law jurists.
Legal Relics of the Handicraft Stage. — Thousands of
cases involving attempts on the part of injured workmen or
their dependents to recover damages resulting from accidents
which were sustained during their regular employment were ad-
judicated under a legal system ill suited to dispense justice
in situations so new and so different that judges in their ad-
herence to common law principles showed themselves utterly
unable to comprehend the meaning of the complex circumstances
14
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surrounding the cases. Economists and sociologists, looking
forward, anticipate changes in the material conditions under
which human beings live. Jurists in their attempts to apply
legal principles to cases before them for decision look back
to tradition for the answer. The great doctrine of "stare
decisis" upon which common law decisions are based is necessarily
in opposition to the approach of the economist or sociologist.
"Stare decisis" means to stand upon the decision of yesterday
in deciding the case of today. Hence, we find the judges fac-
ing a new industrial era with its high speed and dangerous
machinery but looking back to principles of law developed
during an age when industry was in the handicraft stage. Under
such conditions it is not difficult to understand the workman 1 s
contempt for the law nor his opinion as to its failure as an
instrumentality of justice. One has only to read the earlier
cases of industrial accidents and to dwell upon the antiquated
terminology which the court used in handing down its decision
to realize how steeped its jurists were in ancient legal lore,
while at the same time they were utterly lacking in ability to
comprehend the significant and radical changes which had taken
place between employer and employee in a new industrial order.
The following case will not only serve to support the
statement that the legal terminology used by the judge is a
sufficient indication of his failure to recognize greatly al-
tered circumstances, but it will also serve to show how inad-
equate v/ere the antiquated common law rules in their applica-
tion to the conditions of a machine age.

The facts were as follows: A workman was killed when
a derrick chain which had a latent defect "broke. The defendant
employer had purchased the chain in good faith from a reputable
dealer who had represented it to "be of the "best material and
workmanship. The court held that the defendant was not liable.
The decision of the judge is a classic example of a jurist's
ability to live in a machine era, weigh and consider facts
pertaining to machinery in the case "before him, then to delve
deeply into the legal lore of antiquity, not only coming cut
with an answer intended for a past economic era hut expressing
it in the language of that by-gone age. Note the use of the
v/ord "master" which is so suggestive of a small shop of the
handicraft type. Then try to reconcile it with a steel derrick.
One wonders if the judge ever made the attempt. Said the judge:
"The master is not a guarantor of the safety of machinery
or implements furnished his employees and is only bound to use
ordinary care, diligence and skill for the purpose of protect-
ing them, and it is not negligence to use and employ such machin-
ery or implements as the experience of trade and manufacture
sanction as reasonably safe. A purchaser of such an article
from a reputable manufacturer with representations as to its
tested strength and quality of material is not responsible for
hidden defects which cannot be discovered by careful external
examination". *
All of which was undoubtedly good legal theory from the
standpoint of the jurist and of considerable benefit to the
* Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company vs. Heimlick,
127 Fed. 92.
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defendant employer, but certainly it was or little consolation
to the dependents of the workman whose life nad been crushed out.
It is difficult to think of a better example of the
necessary replacement of common law rules by enactment of
statutes than that furnished by questions arising out of in-
dustrial accident cases. When teacners of either law or
economics are in need of an example with which to illustrate
tneir lectures on changing conditions as the motivation for
the enactment of new laws they turn almost instantly to an
example snowing the necessity for some adequate remedy to com-
pensate the workman or nis dependents for loss or life or an
injury sustained while engaged in a hazardous undertaking,
presumably for the benerit of sooiety. Such an example is
classic. Since it so readily suggests itself to the minds of
intelligent people whose profession requires them to think in
terms of social betterment, there can be little question that
here the wisdom of supplanting the common or unwritten law by
means of statute or written law is not to De questioned. Rather,
it points to the older doctrine of the common law as a legal
relic of the handicraft state of industry outliving its useful-
ness by many decades and working havoc on employer and employee
alike in its unjust and ridiculous application to factory con-
ditions of a maohine era. Even during the handicraft stage the
doctrine cited was unfair, placing unjust burdens on conscien-
tious employers, thus giving ruthless competitors a great ad-
vantage over them.
Professor Sly says or the doctrine of Employers 1 Lia-
bility, which laws were enacted to prop up rather than replace
the common law: "Under it not more than ten per cent of the
victims of industrial accidents received any compensation,and of the
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damages paid "by employers the victims received on the average
probably less than fifty per cent". *
This seems to he rather conclusive evidence of the
inability of the common law to cope with the industrial ac-
cident situation which was "becoming a greater problem every
day. As the use of machinery in industry increased, the num-
ber and kind of accidents naturally increased. The skyscrapers
erected might very accurately have been looked upon as steel
monuments to those v/hose lives were taken in the interest of
industrial progress. It is difficult to believe that the
-parents, wives, and children of Industry's dead did not lock
upon these same steel giants of the new era in this way and
rith bitter resentment.
Unjust Application to Modern Factory Conditions .—To
understand more fully the unjust application of common law
rules to cases arising out of industrial accidents one must
of necessity examine the phases of the common law which until
quite recently were applied in such cases, as well as the false
premises upon which they rested.
The injured workman had chance for redress only if his
injury might have been imputed to the negligence of his em-
ployer. His ability to recover damages to compensate him for
his losses depended entirely upon his ability to prevail at
law in a tort action against his employer for negligence. Such
a process was costly, fraught with delay, and the outcome was
decidedly problematical. In fact, when the employer availed
SLY, RICHARD T. , "Outlines of Economics", p. 484.
I
himself of the usual defenses customarily set up, the workman
had little chance of winning a verdict even after he had proven
negligence. His small chance for prevailing in the suit against
his employer was not in general due to an unsympathetic attitude
of the ccurt towards him. The contrary was often the case, and
the defendant employer was awarded the decision even though the
judge may have been personally sympathetic with the injured em-
ployee, simply "because the premises upon which the legal logic
was based were false.
If one understands clearly the meaning of negligence as
the law defines it, it is not difficult to imagine the many and
varied situations in which careful ana intelligent workmen may
meet with serious injury in the performance of their routine,
duties without any negligence on the part of their employers.
Archer writes of negligence as follows: "The law imposes upon
every person the duty to exercise at least ordinary care to
avoid injuring others. A failure to exercise ordinary care
will render a person liable in damages for negligence to any
person who is injured as the proximate result of such failure.
By ordinary care is meant the care that the ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under similar circumstances". *
One can easily understand how the ap rentice or journey-
man working beside his master in the shop of the handicraft era
might impute hie injury to the negligence of his master in those
rare cases when injury occurred. But it takes little imagina-
tion to conceive of workmen in modern industrial plants injured
* ARCHER, GLEASON L.
,
"The Law of Torts", p. 211.

by the score by circumstances quite beyond the control of
either employer or employee at the time of the accident.
Therefore, a suit for negligence instituted by a workman
against an employer, while the only means of redress at one
time, was certainly a poor way of attacking a problem created
by the new industrialism.
Its inefficacy v/as increased by means of the defenses
of which the employer was permitted to avail himself. Of the
three customary defenses available to the employer, the so-
called doctrine of assumption of risk was undoubtedly the most
unfair one. Its availability was due to the fact that the labor
contract was looked upon in the same light as any other contract,
the risks inherent in the occupation presumably being taken for
granted by both employer and employee. This conception is
another example of one of the legal niceties inherited from
English common law which make an excellent reading diet for
the logicians of jurisprudence but which the victims of in-
dustrial tragedies found, exceedingly hard to swallow. The
Anglo-Saxon race has long prided itself upon its sacred right
of contract, and it is upon this sacrosanct privilege that the
theory of assumption of risk is built. Historically, the labor-
er has not always had the right to contract freely for his ser-
vices. The emergence of this right was an event of no small
importance in the development of principles of personal liberty.
Therefore, the jurists in their efforts to preserve these prin-
ciples have carried them out "ad absurdum" to the point at which
we find them reacting detrimentally upon the individual for
whose benefit they were intended. That this outcome was not
clearly foreseen in the early decades of the machine era may
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be inferred from the following statement: "During the first
half of the nineteenth century the terms and conditions of
employment were left almost wholly to the discretion or to the
relative bargaining power of the immediately interested persons.
To them was granted the power of making or breaking the rela-
tion at will. It was presumed that any relationship they chose
to establish was primarily their own concern, that they were
much better qualified than outsiders to determine their mutual
rights and obligations, and that "oney would both obtain fair
terms from their bargaining because they were protected by
competitive forces and by equality before the law. There fol-
lowed the corollary that freely made bargains of this sort would
advance not only the personal interests of the immediate partic-
ipants, but also the general social interest". *
* 3ASSIDY, HARRY M. , "The Emergence of the Free Labor Contract
in England", — The American Economic Review, Volume XVIII,
No. 3, p. 201.

CHAPTER III
DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO IMPL0Y2R
Assumption of Risk*—The spirit of the Judges was close
to that described in ths quotation above in reading into the
law the doctrine of assumption of risk, a doctrine not unrea-
sonable in a country in a stage of economic development in
which a man might work by hand at a bench beside his master
for a wage agreed upon or take up farm land in a less settled
section of the country if the conditions of labor were not to
his liking. It does seem, however, to be a bit far-fetched
in a machine age with its factories, industrial depressions,
bread lines, and hazardous occupations. To the clear thinking
social scientist it reads, "Take the hazard at a questionable
living wage or starve". Th^t, of course, was the practical
effect upon the workmen in tne large urban centers, particularly
in times of depression. If work were scarce, one could not shy
away from a job simply because performing it implied nis taking
the risk of physical injury or loss of life. Nor financiers
and industrialists could not have erected their skyscrapers and
run their machine industries if labor had been unwilling to in-
cur the physical risks inherent in the tasks.
Fellow Servant Rule.—In applying the fellow servant rule
the courts again favored the employers, and decreased the work-
ingman's chance of obtaining money damages for his injury. In
fact the jurists used the doctrine of assumption of risk to prop
up the newer defense known as the fellow servant rule.
22
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To Lord Abinger
,
English jurist, goes the questionable
honor of introducing into the common lav-? both the "assumption
of risk" and "fellow servant" defenses in the same case,
Priestly vs. Fowler in 1837. But it is in reference to the
latter defense that he is quoted. Says the Lord Justice: "As
between the master and a servant injured, it is only demanded
of the master that he shall have taken due care in employing
fellow servants of ordinary skill and carefulness". *
If the above citation referred to the master of a house-
hold and his domestics, it would be a reasonable enough rule.
But when the jurists apply such a precedent to a situation as
greatly emoved from household economics as railroad engineer-
ing, it is high time to question the application of the law.
For example, in 1841 a case occurred in this country in
which a locomotive fireman was injured when the engine was de-
railed. The engineer with whom he was working had been guilty
of negligence. The court ruled for the defendant railroad, de-
claring that the employee had assumed not only the risks inherent
in the job but that he had also assumed the risk that a fellow
employee might be negligent. ** This American precedent was based
upon the decision laid down in the English case of Priestly vs.
Fowler.
The manner in which the courts linked these two defenses
is made very clear in the following citation. Also note how the
judge attempts to make the doctrine seem fair and just by relat-
ing the risk to the amount contained in the employee^ pay envel-
* Cited by EASTMAN
,
CRYSTAL, "Work Accidents and the Law", pp.
173-174.
** Murray vs. the South Carolina Railroad, 36 American Decisions
268.
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ope. Farwell vs. The Boston & Worcester Railroad Corporation
was a case in which a switchman had failed to set a switch
properly with the result that an engineer was injured in an
accident caused thereby. The court said: "The general rule
resulting from consideration of justice as well as of policy
is that he who engages in the employment of another for the
performance of specified duties and services for compensation
takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and peril
incident to the performance of such services, and, in legal
presumption, the compensation is adjusted accordingly. And we
are not aware of any principle which should except the perils
arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who are
in the sane employment. These are perils which the servant is
likely to know, and against which he can as effectually guard
as the master. They are perils of the service, and which can
he as distinctly foreseen and provided for in the rate of
compensation as any others". *
Again one finds the jurist applying the obsolete term,
"master", to an artificial being in the person of a railroad
corporation and "servant" to a locomotive engineer. What more
evidence is needed to show how lacking the judges were in
ability to comprehend the conditions of modern machine civil-
ization?
* Cited by MI CHELBACH2R , G. F. , and UIAL, THOITAS M. , "Workmen's
Compensation Insurance", p. 64

Contributory Negligence . --One can hardly blame them,
however, for permitting the defense cf contributory negligence
to be raised. Such a defense is a very logical and natural
one in a case where the plaintiff chsrgee negligence. Not
that it is any more correct than either of the other customary
defenses when we look at the industrial accident from the more
modern and socially significant point of view. But at least
it was not faulty legal logic. With the industrial accident
case resting upon the false premise of an imputation of neg-
ligence on the part of the employer, it was natural to expect
such a defense to be raised.
Employer's Liability Laws . --Such were the harsh rules
of common law, making it almost impossible for a workman to
gain a verdict, to compensate him for injury. The situation
was virtually the same in every state, although some attempted
to soften the harsh rules of common lav/ by the enactment of
statutes known as Employer's Liability Laws. But it was close
to the beginning of the twentieth century before many states
had adopted these codes. They were anything but uniform,
varying with the individual states. It is not difficult to
see why their passage would meet with considerable opposition
on the part of manufacturers, but their enactment was a very
definite step leading up to the later adoption of a workmen 1 s
compensation law. Jurists themselves were beginning to recog-
nize the unjust application of common law rules to situations
previously undreamed of. The opinion of the court in the case
of Driscoll vs. Allis-Chalraers Company is an interesting one
from this point of view. Said the court: "If it be said that

some of these rules are archaic and unfitted to modern condi-
tions, I do not disagree; in fact that has "been my own opinion
for long. Upon reflection it seems that this could hardly he
otherwise. Principles which were first laid down in the days
of the small shop, few employees, simple machinery, c :uld hardly
"be expected to apply with justice to the industrial conditions
which now surround us. In those earlier days the laborer ordina-
rily knew his fellow workmen, worked with timple machinery, and
ran comparatively small risk of injury. The genius of our present
remarkable industrial development requires that he carry on his
patient toil in company with veritable armies of fellow men,
many of whom he can neither see nor Know; it surrounds him with
mighty and complicated machinery driven by forces beyond his
control, whose relentless strength rivals that of the thunder-
bolt itself, and it requires him to labor day by day with fac-
ulties at highest tension in places where death lurks in ambush
at his elbow, awaiting only a moments inadvertence before it
strikes." *
But, it should be noted that this opinion was not written
until 1911. Furthermore, it was the opinion of a Wisconsin judge
whose enlightenment upon the circumstances surrounding the case
may be accounted for in some measure by the fact that this state
led all others in its recognition of the principles of social
justice
•
Driscoll vs. Allis-Chalraers Company, 144 Wisconsin 451 •
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Prohibitive Cost of Litigation . —The opportunity for
the injured workman to obtain a favorable decision in the law
courts of Connecticut or in the courts of any other state was
small indeed. But when one considers the actual cost of litiga-
tion to the injured or to the dependents of the deceased, it
seems surprising that the injured workman or his dependents
were at all able to fight for the small chance which the law
courts gave them to attain some measure of compensation for
the loss of life and limb and of earning power so frequently
sustained.
It is no exaggeration to state that under common law
rules and even under the somewhat modified Enployer's Liability
Laws the cost of litigation in many cases of real distress was
actually prohibitive. In other words the more necessary was the
need for financial aid, the less likely was the injured party or
his dependents to receive it. Although there were a great many
lawyers, commonly called ambulance chasers, who were willing
to take a case on a contingent fee basis, the delays incident
to the adjudication of the case in court were so great that an
injured workman or his dependents who did not have considerable
financial backing would be unable to avail themselves of the
services of even these oft-criticised members of the legal pro-
fession. Not only would the injured workman in the vast majority
of cases be immediately relieved of his job and the subsequent
future security that an industrial connection might afford as
soon as he took legal action against his employer, but every
court case was fraught with such delay that unless the workman
or his family had considerable savings to which to resort in
time of need or some other source of financial aid, the very
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thought of litigation was hopeless. It takes little imagina-
tion to see that only in a small minority of the oases the in-
jured employee or his dependents were in a position to battle
in the courts. And tnose who did receive a favorable decision
were small indeed to tne proportion of all workmen injured.
Unfair Settlements Dy Negotiation. --What was the result?
The only result which oould be expected under such an archaic
system of justice. The injured workman was compelled to permit
nis employer to drive a harsh bargain. He mi^ht accept a small
sum in settlement of all his legal claims or taice the uncertainty
offered by tne law courts and the privation while waiting for
their judges to weigh antiquated precedents. If the injured
workman's employer were insured, the employee nad a much more
skillful adversary with whom to contend in the opposing in-
surance company, skilled in the technique of intimidating work-
men too poor to obtain legal counsel or too ignorant to imow
their rights.
Settlement by negotiation then became a common means of
adjustment — a means in which workmen exchanged arms and legs
for small sums of money or jobs as night watchmen while the em-
ployers of labor Decame multi-millionaires and were hailed as
Captains of Industry and Builders of Empires of Steel. Mean-
while, tneir sons and nephews trained in the university law
schools which their kinsfolk endowed, sustained their industrial
forebears with weighty decisions, classic in their adherence
to an outworn tradition and masterly in their appropriation of
the hairsplitting dialectics of the English jurists of the 18th
Century.

CHAPTER IV
EUROPEAN BACKGROUND OF WORSKEH'S COMPENSATION
A survey of the history of the workmen's Compensation
movement in Europe is pertinent to the development of the thesis
at this point; for, an appreciation of the historical background
of the compensation movement in Europe, where it originated, is
necessary to a clear understanding of that same movement in the
United States and also to the particular section of the United
States to which this thesis has special application. A tendency
toward social legislation of a particular type is usually world-
wide. It is rarely the result of soci&l phenomena peculiar to
the locality where it may be observed to set forces in motion.
These social forces sweep across the world in currents of ideas
that take root in the minds of men. Thus, the student of social
insurance in Connecticut not only reaches the ultimate general
conclusion of the German student in the same field, but if the
experience of the German nation with social insurance has been
more extensive for various reasons, the student in Connecticut
is influenced by the results of such study in Germany, and he
wisely takes such prior and superior experience into considera-
tion before drawing his own conclusions. Therefore, since
social forces are world-wide in their movement, and in no re-
spect as provincial as the people whom they affect, the legisla-
tive machinery set up to regulate and control them should be
designed and installed only after those responsible for putting
29
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such legislative machinery in motion have had the time and
opportunity to study what other nations and states have done.
In a later section of the thesis we shall see that the various
committees and experts dealing with the Workmen^ Compensation
problem in Connecticut resorted to such an examination of the
historical development of the movement as that which we are
about to makB •
A second reason for delving into the history of European
experience with Workmen's Compensation concerns itself with our
obtaining a sufficient grasp of the movement to survey the
development of Workmen's Compensation in Connecticut with a
sense of critical appraisal. For example, is the Connecticut
legislation regarding this issue as efficacious in accomplish-
ing the purpose for which its adherents strove as it might be?
What lessons has Connecticut learned from the greater experience
of Europe? What effect has this experience had in shaping the
provisions of the Connecticut Act? A further appraisal of
Connecticut's history may be made in connection with the atti-
tude which caused her legislators to delay this form of social
legislation so many ywars after Europe had provided a wealth
of experience and amassed a weighty body of evidence in favor
of the principle. It must be stated in passing, however, that
Connecticut compared favorably with other states in our country;
but all were woefully delinquent in according recognition to this
type of social legislation.
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Germany. —The first nation to adopt a workmen's compen-
sation lav/ was Germany and quite logically the compensation
principle has been carried to its greatest development in that
country. The Reichstag passed a compensation bill on July 6,
1884, which became the foundation for all subsequent legisla-
tion in that country and a model upon which later legislation
of a similar nature in other countries adopting the principle
was based.
In Germany, as in many other countries, the compensation
code was preceded by a gradual abrogation of common law prin-
ciples and the enactment of a Liability Act in 1871. But a
movement for compulsory compensation insurance developed and
later gained considerable headway. "Bismarck, who had orig-
inally opposed the idea, finally adopted it with the purpose
both of taking from the socialists some of their ammunition
and of convincing the people of the beneficence of the State
as it then existed." *
Writing on the same phase of the subject Rhodes says:
"While upon a superficial examination it may appear that the
adoption of the social insurance system of Germany may be
attributed to the genius and constructive statesmanship of
Bismarck, a deeper study of the subject will show that for many
years forces had been at work in this direction, that the adoptio
of the system was a consummation, and that the work of Bismarck
was that of direction rather than that of creation. The system
is essentially socialistic in its nature, and so it is the consum
* BLATTCHARD, R. H.
,
"Liability and Compensation Insurance", p. 84
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mation of the ideas of the socialist whose influence has been
so strong in Germany, V/hile the name of Karl Marx is more in-
timately associated with the mention of German socialism than
that of any of the other leaders, many of the ideas which con-
stitute the basis of the socialistic propaganda are those of
other leaders, and -this idea of the protection of individuals
and their families against the consequences of crushing mis-
fortunes is attributed to LaSalle rather than to Karl Marx.
He recognized xhe function of the government to protect the
individual against force * and fraud, but in addition to this
he contended that it was the function and the duty of govern-
ment to protect against other misfortunes the consequences
of which might be Just as real." **
The workmen's compensation insurance in Germany is merely
a part of a comprehensive social insurance system which thor-
oughly protects the German working people from many types of
adversity. Sickness, as well as accident insurance, is compul-
sory. In the case of sickness insurance the employee contributes
two-thirds to the fund while the employer contributes only one-
third. This compulsory sickness insurance is used to supple-
ment the accident insurance in the respect that during the first
thirteen weeks of his illness, whether it was caused by an in-
dustrial accident or not, the German workman is covered by the
sickness fund; consequently, there is no waiting period. Mutual
associations are the only form of insurer available. In Germany
they have shown great efficiency under a compulsory insurance
system.
* One might ask if an injury is not at least a case of "force".
** RHODES, J. E. , "Workmen's Compensation", p. 44
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Norway.—Ten years after the German compensation law
went into effect Norway passed an act making Workmen's Compen-
sation insurance not only compulsory but giving the state the
monopoly on the insurance required under the Act. The Act,
which has since been amended several times to make its in-
fluence more widespread, went into effect July 1, 1895. *
While the Norwegian government studied the experience of this
form of insurance in Germany and Austria and profited by that
experience, it did not stop at the same limits which it had
observed in Germany and Austria. The chief improvement Norway
made when adapting the experience of Germany and Austria to its
own problem was to put its indemnities on a reserve or capital-
ized value basis rather than on an assessment basis. This means
that when an employee in Norway is permanently disabled, funds
sufficient to provide an annuity are immediately provided by
the state insurance department, while in Germany in a similar
situation the annual payments due the permanently disabled
i orkman would be met by assessment year by year as he required
them. The state monopoly in Norway makes this special assurance
to the disabled possible while in Germany the influence of the
employers in the system permits them to elect the annual assess-
ment alternative which they favor because it gives them control
of slightly more capital for business operations, payments being
provided for only when actually due.
* FRANKS! and DAWSON, "Workingmen ' s Insurance in Europe", p. 50
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Finland.—In 1895 Finland enacted a compulsory V/orkmen's
Compensation lav/, but the state neither monopolized nor competed
with private corporation or mutual association of employers in
insuring the indemnity. The Finnish law, while one of the first
and for that reason worthy of distinction, is poor in some re-
spects. Its two chief weaknesses in the light of the compensate
principle are that it permits the employer to invoke gross neg-
ligence as a defense, thus reverting the situation to one of
culpability, and providing the insurance companies with a de-
fense capable of considerable extension under the skillful man-
ipulation of expert tort lawyers. Any reversion to common law
principles in the industrial accident situation is to be regret-
ted in the light of modern social theory. The second weakness
in the Finnish law is the fact that it makes no provision for
medical aid. Connecticut on the contrary is to be commended
in its adherence to the principle that medical aid should be
unlimited. The employer in Finland is further relieved of all
liability by insuring in a mutual association. * These are the
high points in the Finnish experience of interest to us. It is
noteworthy that Finland, a country lacking in natural resources
and in no sense an industrial nation, antedated the average
American state in its recognition of the compensation principle
by twenty years.
FRAHKEL and DAV/30N, "Workmen's Insurance in Europe", p. 19
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Great Britain.—Blanchard feels th&t in Great Britain
ideas 01" individualism and freedom of contract nave delayed
the enactment of statutes dealing with employer's liability
and workmen's compensation. He is also of the opinion that
these same ideas have restricted the scope of such laws as
have been enacted. Prior to 1880 recovery for injuries sus-
tained in injury was governed by common law rules oi* negligence
which according to this same writer went to such length in the
protection of tne employer that it was practically impossible
for a workman to secure damages.
The Employers' Liability Act of 1880 was tne first leg-
islative measure to counteract the older rules of common law.
When certain kinds of negligence could be proved tnis Act con-
siderably modified the Fellow Servant Rule and the doctrine
of assumption of risk, but it left untouched the defense of
contributory negligence. Realizing the inadequacy of the Act
of 1880, Mr. Asquith introduced a bill in Parliament in 1893
which attempted to add to the features of the employers' lia-
bility law, but it was defeated.
In 1897 'i'he Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted. It
became the first law of its kind in English speaking countries.
The statement tnat "sound economic doctrine requires that the
employer shall take all the ordinary and extraordinary risks in-
volved in the carrying on of nis industry" urged in support of
the bill was quite contrary to the theory laid down in Priestly
vs. Fowler. *
* BLAUCHARD, R. H.
,
"Liability and Compensation Insurance", pp.
88-90

CHAPTER V
EUROPEAN BACKGROUND OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Denmark. --On January 7, 1898, Denmark passed a Workmen 1 s
Compensation law applying "to industries of all sorts, espec-
ially to those conducted in factories, those employing steam,
electricity, wired and water power; to ships and oversea navi-
gation, railroads and tramways, and the larger building trades".
* Denmark does not make compensation insurance compulsory; there-
fore, there is no obligation on the part of the employer to in-
sure. As a matter of fact, slightly more than ninety-one per
cent of all industrial accident cases settled before the state
council in 1906 wer^ cases in which the employers had insurance
coverage. The insurer in Denmark may be either a private cor-
poration or an employer* s mutual association. Mutual companies
have the larger share of the patronage, and, according to
Frankel and Dawson ** were increasing in popularity as early
as 1906. Incidentally, this was one year prior to the appoint-
ment of the first committee by the Governor of the State of
Connecticut to investigate the matter of industrial accidents.
While the Danish system is elective as far as the com-
pulsory insurance feature is concerned, and while the state
does not compete for the insurance business, there are several
features in the Danish system worthy of note and probably val-
uable to the student or legislator engaged in an evaluation of
* FRANKS! and DAWSON, "Workingmen 1 s Insurance in Europe", p. 55
** Idem.
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the features of the compensation system of his own state or
country.
The outstanding feature of the Danish system is the
special Workingmen's Insurance Council, called the "Arbejder
Forsikrings Raad". The function of the Raad is "chiefly as
a department for the adjustment of claims; it determines
whether the employer is liable, the nature and degree of the
impairment of earning power of the workman, and the amount of
indemnity payable. Every adjustment must he made through it .
whether the employer is liable or not . and its decisions are
final .* There may be an appeal from the decision of the orig-
inal referees to the chief of the department, but none beyond
that, except to the courts on the construction of the statute.
By this means, private companies are spared the expense of
adjustments, and have only to pay the claims for which the
state department decides they are liable. The plan has been
satisfactory to workmen and employers, and singularly, also
to the insurance companies". ** The latter fact should be of
particular interest to the student of Workmen's Compensation
in Connecticut; for no less an authority than a member of
the legislative committee which investigated the matter in
Connecticut and helped draft the Act admitted to the writer
during a personal interview that this question of the form
of insurance became the main issue before the final passage
of the bill. The writer further understands that after fifteen
The italics are my own.
; FRAHKEL and DAWSON, "Workingmen's Insurance in Europe p. 55-
war-
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years of experience with this form of insurance the private
insurance corporations, in some cases, do not consider work-
men T s compensation insurance a highly profitable type of con-
tract. To whet extent the cost of maintaining this division
of their organization might "be decreased by reducing the cost
of adjustments under a system of state supervision similar
to that existing in Denmark might constitute a profitable
subject for study on the part of insurance corporations.
The Danish system provides an excellent example of
private enterprise under government supervision, a form of
control which capitalistic enterprise might well look to as
a guarantor of its future existence, and as a sane alterna-
tive to rutright government ownership such as is found in the
socialistic state. It should be noted that the Danish plan
proved satisfactory to all interested parties.
There are four departments in the Raad differentiated
according to broad lines of occupational activity. Each de-
partment has seven directors, two representing employers, two
employees, and three who are appointed by the king, the ap-
pointees of the king being the same for all four departments.
The employee has the right to recourse against his em-
ployer in the common law courts without the consent of the
Raad, or to arbitration before the Raad. If the employee
accepts the award of the Raad he loses his common law right
to sue, but if he sues at common law and loses he has no re-
dress under the statute, unless he had previously obtained
the consent of the Raad to bring suit. This consent, ho\ ever,

is rarely granted unless the employer had b e~n guilty of gross
criminal negligence.
The Danish system has been treated at considerable
length because it is felt it offers an opportunity for study,
which is particularly valuable to the student of the Connecticut
system of compensation, and although enacted in 1898 it seems
to embody in many respects features more applicable today in
the United States than ever before.
France.—The French law, also enacted in 1898, is worthy
of some consideration, for it contains a provision somewhat
unique yet not unworthy of study with a view to its adoption
in Connecticut or in any other of our American systems. The
French compensation law resembles that of Denmark in the re-
spect that there is no compulsion to insure. In brief tne history
of its evolution is quite similar to that in many states. The
expression that history repeats itself is well borne out by a
study of the compensation system of various states. The follow-
ing quotation from Frankel and Dawson, summarizing the French
experience has a rather familiar ring to the student of compar-
ative systems of workingmen's compensation. "The law which Isolds
the employer liable and provides for voluntary insurance was
a compromise between the demands of the Chamber of Deputies
for compulsory insurance and the oppositions of the conserva-
tive Senate. The result is a mean between the English and the
Italian laws. Like the English lav/, it establishes strict
liability of the individual employer, but it excels in requir-
ing greater security for the payment of every possible claim.
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Unlike the Italian, however, it does not require the employer
to insure". *
Some points significant of comparison are the follow-
ing: The original French law enacted in 1898 applied to work-
men employed in all industrial establishments without regard to
the number employed in any one establishment, 'i'he Connecticut
Act, on tne other hand, specifies that the statute does not
apply to employers of less than five workmen, 'mere was con-
siderable discussion of this point during the public hearings
before the legislative committee in 1913. liven Professor Clyde
Fisher of wesleyan University, one of the most ardent champions
of workmen^ compensation in Connecticut, thought that the limit
must be placed somewhere regarding the number of employees in
any establishment in determining whether or not any employer
was within the statute. When one studies the stenographic re-
ports of these hearings he gets the distinct impression that
this limitation waB framed as a oonoession to the farmers of
Connecticut, the majority of whom would regularly employ less
than five hands. Professor Fisher, himself, states that a limit
of four would be more inclusive and therefore better than five,
but states, presumably as a concession to probable opponents of
the law in agricultural circles, that the limit must be placed
somewhere. In Connecticut the influence of the farm element
would not be an inconsiderable one. The French law of 1898
did not, of course, cover agricultural laborers. In fact, ag-
ricultural workers are still excluded with the exception of
* FRANKS! and DAWSON, "Workingnen 1 s Insurance in Europe", p. 64
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persons engaged in the use of agricultural machines or witk
motive power used to drive them. This latter group were
totally
unprotected until an amendment was passed on June 30, 1899,
providing for their inclusion under circumstances described
above.
On April 12, 1906, a second and obviously more important
amendment was that which extended the benefits of the Act to
employees of mercantile establishments, many of whom are often
subject to greater dangers than many employers of the industrial
group, notably truck drivers and delivery men in the larger
French cities.
There are many interesting features of the French com-
pensation law which one passes over reluctantly, for the writer
is of the distinct opinion that the student of Workmen's
Com-
pensation cannot have too broad an outlook on this subject, no
matter how limited, territorially, the scope of his study must
necessarily be. The alleviation of human suffering and the
betterment of mankind know no boundaries. Industrial accidents
the world over have in common the loss of members of the human
body and disablement, accompanied by suffering and privation.
Students of the subject cannot go too far afield if the study
of the treatment of these problems abroad may possibly contri-
bute one idea calculated to relieve human suffering at home.
t
CHAPTER VI
STRUGGLE FOR i.ORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN CONNECTICUT
The experience of Connecticut with workmen's compensation
was very similar to that of many other states. In Connecticut
as elsewhere there was a long period characterized by an unjust
application of common law rules of negligence to the industrial
accident C8se. There followed a period of agitation on the part
of groups particularly affected, legislative investigations and
public hearings, then finally the framing of a compensation code
and the enactment of that code into a chapter of the laws of
Connecti cut.
Common Law Period. --During the second quarter of the
nineteenth century the Connecticut courts heard many a case
arising out of the industrial accident, and in a manner sim-
ilar to that employed in the courts of other states these cases
were decided upon the theory of "stare decisis". One finds, then,
the Jurists of Connecticut referring to the English case of
Priestly vs. Fowler (3 Mes. and >Vels. 1) decided in 1837, to
Murray vs. the South Carolina Railroad Company, (1 McMullan 335)
the American precedent of 1841, to Farwell vs. the Boston and
Worcester Railway Corporation (4 Metcalf 49) of 1842, and then
returning to England for Hutchinson vs. York N. & B. Rwy. Co.
of 1850 (15 Exch. 343) until the Connecticut jurists could point
to a precedent of their own. Such an opportunity presented it-
self in 1867 when the Supreme Court of Errors heard an appeal
in Burke vs. Norwich and Worcester Railroad Company (34 Conn. 474).
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Let it be said, to the credit of Justice McCurdy, however,
who dared not flaunt the doctrine of "stare decisis", that al-
though he adopted the Fellow Servant Rule in this case, thus
formally making that rule a part of the common law doctrine of
Connecticut, he did so "not without some hesitation, and since
thet time it has been applied by our courts", the Judge continues,
"eliciting, however, from time to time occasional remarks by
some judges as to its injustice".
Justice McCurdy also questions the justness of the doc-
trine of assumption of risk, which we have seen to be so often
coupled with the Fellow Servant Rule. In the same case this
jurist says: "The justness of this reasoning has been questioned
by high judicial authority. (Little Miami Railroad Company vs.
Stevens, 20 Ohio 435) However, plausible may be the theory
it is vary doubtful whether, in fact, a spinner in a factory
or a fireman on a railroad ever made an examination into the
condition of the machinery, the mode of conducting the business,
or the character and habits of the operatives, for the purpose
of ascertaining the extent of his risk, as an element in cal-
culating the proper amount of his wages".
In Darrigan vs. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co. (52 Conn. 285)
the application of the Fellow Servant Rule was somewhat modi-
fied, but it had been made a part of the law, the damage was
done, when the Fellow Servant Rule was written into the Connec-
ticut law in Burke vs. the Norwich and Worcester Railroad Company
in 1867. This doctrine became more strongly entrenched as each
succeeding decision, going back to Priestly vs. Fowler, added
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the weight of authority. As late aa 1907 by which time ten
European countries, as well as iiew Zealand and South Austra-
lia, had enacted workmen's compensation acts, the fellow Ser-
vant Rule was so strongly embedded in the common law in Con-
necticut that the committee appointed by the governor to in-
vestigate and report regarding legislation to regulate the
liability of employers in preparing its conclusions said:
"In the opinion of your committee it is not wise or advis-
able to abrogate in toto the rule of Fellow Servant, without
in any manner limiting the amounts which may be recovered
against the employer on account of injuries wnich he may suf-
fer through the negligence of a co-employee. Your committee
does not therefore recommend for your favorable consideration
House Bill Ho. 39, which provides for the abrogation of the
rule of Fellow Servant". *
Governor's Committee of 1907. --By Senate Joint Resolu-
tion, approved on "February 27, 1907, The Connecticut General
Assembly authorized tne governor to appoint a committee of
three persons, one to be an employer, one a representative of
labor, one a lawyer to investigate tne question of the liability
of employers for industrial accidents. On March 4, 1907, Gov-
ernor Rollin S. Woodruff appointed Edward M. Day, E*. Allen
Moore, and Cnarles J. Donahue, to the committee. Hone of the
members of the committee were members of The General Assembly.
The time to complete the study was extended by the legislature
* STATE OF CONNECTICUT - PUBLIC DOCUMENTS (S. J. R. No. 228,
Session 1907) p. 28
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from April 2 to May 20, 1907, upon the request of the commit-
tee. The work of the committee is well described in its re-
port to the General Assembly: "Immediat ely upon organizing
as a committee, after notice was given to all interested
in the question of legislation affecting the liability of
employers to employees, public hearings were held, and your
committee has endeavored in every way so to accommodate it-
self to the convenience of those desiring to be heard as to
get the fullest possible discussion of this question.
"No bills for proposed legislation were presented to
your committee, but your committee assigned for hearings three
bills introduced to your Assembly which were referred to the
Judiciary Committee. Of these three bills one provided in
substance for the abrogation of what is known as the Fellow
Servant Rule, and the other two bills provided in substance
for acts known as Employers 1 Liability Acts. These three
bills served as the basis for a general discussion before your
committee of the important question of legislation affecting
the liability of employers to employees. Not only its legal
phases were considered before your committee, but the question
was treated to some extent from its economic and social as-
pects; and it may be said at once that those advocating some
legislation proposed first, either the abrogation of what is
known as the Fellow Servant Rule; or, second, the enactment
of a law similar to whot is generally known as an Employers'
Liability Act; or,- third, legislation carrying out in principle
what are known in other countries as Workmen's Compensation
Acts. Those in favor of these proposed changes in the
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law of our State were fully neard by your committee, while
objections to each of them were pointed oat and discussed
by those who thought it was nardly possible to enact a law
affecting the relations of employer to employee wnich would
be fairer and more Just to all concerned than the law of Con-
necticut as it now stands,
"The members of your committee not only listened to
the discussions of these questions at the public hearings,
but nave investigated the subject themselves so far as the
limited amount of time would allow them, endeavoring in every
way to so inform themselves as to be able to act intelligently
and wisely in regard to this important matter."
The quotation above is taken from a "Report submitted
to the General Assembly by the committee appointed to inves-
tigate and report regarding legislation to regulate the lia-
bility of employers", a twenty-nine page pamphlet, which pre-
sents the results of the study made by this committee. In
this report the committee reviews the history of the fellow
Servant Rule, Hknployers 1 Liability Acts, and V/orkingmen 1 s Com-
pensation Acts. The attitude taken in the report is quite
timid and conservative. After admitting that: "It is sig-
nificant that Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Hungary, France,
Italy, Holland, Denmark, Spain, Mew Zealand, and South Austria
have gone on from treating the subject on the ground of legal
liability to the enactment of workraen f s compensation acts
largely similar to tne Workmen 1 s Compensation Act of Germany"
at the very end of the report the committee states: "Whether
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such legislation for Connecticut is practical and sensible
at the present time, your committee does not uncertake to say".
The committee, now ever, would consider a further study
of the subject advisable. Meanwhile, the learned judges de-
feat the Just claims of dependents for compensation, stating
that the "Master" in the guise of a railroad corporation is
not liable for the acts committed by a fellow servant, tne
fellow servant being a signal-man some miles from the scene
of the accident.
Rubinow summarizes the work of the Connecticut commit-
t-ee very tersely: "The committee made a brief though fairly
clear study of some compensation laws, admitting willingly
all the virtues of the system, but could not agree to recom-
mend a bill to that effect, mainly because of fear of inter-
state competition". *
The Compensation Movement in Other States.—The first
real Compensation Act in the United States was passed by Con-
gress for the protection of some government employees on May
30, 1908. It was very limited in its application, but it was
the first effective compensation law in tne United States. **
In the several states compensation acts were frequently de-
feated on questions of constitutionality as the following quo-
tation will show: "The first American Compensation Act was
passed in Maryland in 1902. It applied to only a few occu-
pations and was declared unconstitutional in 1904, upon the
* RUB IHOW, I. M. , "Social Insurance", p. 159
** Idem
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grounds that it denied the right of trial by Jury, and con-
ferred Judicial functions upon an executive officer, Montana
adopted a Compensation Act in 1909, which was declared by its
Supreme Court to be valid in its essential features, but un-
constitutional upon a minor ground. Maryland in 1910 and New
York in 1911 enacted a general compulsory law for hazardous
occupations, tne latter being declared unconstitutional in
the celebrated case of Ives vs. South Buffalo R. Co. (201 U. Y*
271, 94 H. £• 421). A constitutional amendment was promptly
passed in New xork, under which a new statute has been enacted
and held valid, i'he decision in the Ives case had the effect
of turning the trend of compensation legislation for a time
from compulsory to elective laws." *
Connecticut Committees of 1911 and 1913.—A nationwide
interest in the compensation movement developed rapidly. Labor
associations, insurance companies, and in some instances manu-
facturers seeking a more stable type of redress than that af-
forded by the law courts wnich sometimes released them from all
liability but at other times drove them into bankruptcy, agi-
tated for legislation of tnis character. In 1911 the Governor
of Connecticut appointed a committee, without legislative author-
ity, to study the question of workmen's compensation, but the
results were no more permanent than those of the committee or
1907.
However, the committee appointed in 1913 after many
spirited public hearings in important centers in the state
* PILLSBURY, WARRE1I H.
,
"Employers' Liability and Workmen's
Compensation" - Modern American Law Series - pp. 24-2i>
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drafted a Compensation Act which was adopted in 1913 as
Chapter 138 of the Public Acts of that year. The law be-
came effective as of January 1, 1914. It has been amended
on various occasions since its adoption, generally attain-
ing greater effectiveness with each succeeding amendment and
as the experience of the commissioners accumulates. The
present text of the Workmen's Compensation Act appears in
Chapter 280 of the "General Statutes of Connecticut", Re-
vision of 1930, as amended by Chapter 9 and Chapter 132 of
the Public Acts of 1931.
Opposition to the Act.—Although the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act was passed in 1913, its passage was not secured
without great opposition on the part of many industrialists
whose comprehension of social justice was about as small as
their altruistic tendencies. The Workmen's Compensation Act
has matured in the Connecticut law for over twenty-one years,
but many of these same individuals have no more conception of
its meaning and purpose than their grandfathers in 1867. Fur-
thermore, the writer has information from authoritative sources
that the younger element among this group, many of whom were not
long out of the cradle when the compensation act became a law
in Connecticut, have not ceased to prattle and are among its
most bitter opponents. The opposition, of course, is of a
sub-rosa nature, taking the form of lobbying to invalidate many
of the provisions of the Act by stifling appropriations for its
adequate enforcement.

PART TWO
PRINCIPLES OF COMPENSATION
DEDUCED FROM
THE CONNECTICUT ACT

CHAPTER VII
EMPLOYER ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY
The chief distinction, of course, between the spirit
and letter of the common law and Employees Liability laws,
on the one hand, and Workmen's Compensation, on the other, is
the elimination of a theory of culpability. Who was to blame?
is not the point at issue when one views the industrial ac-
cident from the newer angle taken in Workmen's Compensation.
Culpability might be difficult to establish under modern con-
ditions of machine enterprise, but the theory behind Workmen's
Compensation eliminates this type of inquiry. In its place
it simply asks, "Was the injury sustained out of and in the
course of one's regular employment?" If the answer is in the
affirmative, then the injury is considered to be a compensable
one.
Economic Principles Involved.—The reason for this stand
on the part of the advocates and interpreters of Workmen's Com-
pensation is based upon economic and sociological theories,
rather than upon rules of law. It i s not necessary to deter-
mine who was to blame, but merely to ascertain if the injury
occurred in any task incident to employment in an occupation
presumably of benefit to society. The fact that society de-
mands and uses the products and services, the production of
which leaves its trains of maimed, crippled, and dead along
the Trail of Progress is sufficient reason for compensating
the unfortunate victims who have fallen by the way. The
cost of their disabilities is very properly a part of the
50
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cost of the gocds or services produced, and as such should
be paid for "by those vho enjoy the benefits of the injured
workman's labor. This cost, of course, is actually reflected
in the price of the goods which the consumer pays. The em-
ployer can readily pass it on to insurance companies or state
funds by the payment cf a premium which is only a small frac-
tion of the cost of all articles. The actual percentage of
such premiums in Connecticut has been estimated at from one
to two per cent of the total production cost.
The acceptance of such a theory now embodied in the
Workmen' s Compensation Act in Connecticut was no overnight
job. It was not an easy task in many of our American states,
but it did become a fact, in spite of opposition. Even now
the writer has been assured from official sources that many
of the manufacturers feel that they have been forced to
swallow a bitter pill. Secretaries of manufacturers' associa-
tions actually receive both cash and enthusiastic applause
for oratorical efforts which characterize this laudable piece
of just and humanitarian legislation as an unjust law in which
the manufacturer is compelled to pay the cost of accidents ,
which he had no part in causing. Yet, just a few years ago
these same ice -water orators referred to any and all members
of the German race as uncouth barbarians who were destroying
the fountain heads of civilization, when as a matter of fact
Germany had accepted humane legislation of this character as
early as 1884, just thirty years before the law went into
effect in Connecticut.

DZ
Election of Manner of Liability Under Four Main Parts
of Act.—Even at that time the efforts of the legislators might
have Deen brushed aside by the Supreme Court of Errors if the
committee that drafted the law nad not been clever enough to
prepare the text in a manner calculated to avoid the pitfalls
encountered in several other states. The question of constitu-
tionability was avoided by preparing a so-called elective com-
pensation law. As a matter of fact the law leaves the employer
very little to elect. He may choose to become liable either
under "Part A" styled "Employer's Liability" or under "Part Jti"
neaded "Workmen 1 s Compensation". While he is given the free-
dom of an apparent choice, and, therefore, it is legal istically
reasoned that since ne is free to make up his own mind, he is
not being deprived of any of his constitutional rights, actually
this is merely a clever way of forcing a piece of social legis-
lation without stumbling across vague constitutional objections.
As we shall presently see the law in effect says to the employer,
"Accept Workmen's Compensation (Part B) or else -----". For
example, in "Part A", Section 5224 reads:
"Common-law Defenses Abolished. --In an action to recover
damages for personal injury sustained by an employee arising
out of and in the course of his employment, or for death re-
sulting from injury so sustained, it shall not be a defense:
(a) that the injured employee was negligent; lb) that the in-
jury was caused by the negligence of a fellow employee; (c)
that the injured employee had assumed the risk of tne injury". *
The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 52£4.
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It is quite apparent that the text of Section 5224 of
the Act immediately deprives the employer of the common law
defenses which previously stood him in such good stead. The
law simply states that the injured employee cannot be con-
sidered to have been negligent, nor can nis fellow employee
be considered to have been negligent, nor can it be inferred
that the employee assumed risks inherent to the occupation.
Section 5224 abolishes all these common law defenses in Just
about as many strokes of the pen as it takes to write the text
of this section. Now, in Section 5225 the law, after exempt-
ing certain groups or employees continues,
nor shall the same provisions (those contained in Section 5224)
apply to actions against any employer wno shall have accepted
"Part B" of this chapter in the manner hereinafter prescribed".
The exemptions mentioned above applied to any employers
having regularly less than five employees; to employees of
outworkers; and to employers of casual employees. It takes
little imagination to see that there was little in the way
of free election in the text to employers to whom its provi-
sion applied. As a matter of fact, if it had not he en for the
provisions of "Part C" and "Part D", which provided for the
formation of mutual association of employers along lines fol-
lowed in Germany to undertake to insure risks placed upon
them in "Part B" or for the right to insure their liability
in recognized stock companies, it is questionable whether the
The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 19S1, Section 5225
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law could have "been maintained in the face of very evident
arguments questioning its const itutionability . When one
reads "Part C", Section 5283, it can easily he seen that
the only real compulsion placed upon the employer coming
vithin the Act is compulsion to insure. An argument re-
garding the constitutional) ility of the law viewed from this
angle should he considered as valid as a defense of a law
in Massachusetts which makes the carrying of personal in-
jury insurance compulsory on the part of the automobile
owner. Surely, the industrialist when he maintains foun-
dries, machine shops, and railroads is playing with machin-
ery equally as threatening to the personal safety of those
about him as is the automobile owner.

CHAPTER VIII
EXTSOT OF LIABILITY UNDER THE ACT
Types of Employment Covered.— Every employer of five
or more employees is presumed to accept "Part B" of the
Workmen^ Compensation Act unless ne elects to become liable
under the Employers 1 Liability rules specified in "Part A".
Section 5223 defines an employee as follows: " Employee 1
shall mean any person who has entered into or works under
any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer,
whether such contract contemplated the performance of duties
within or without the state, and shall also include any sal-
aried officer or paid member of any police department or fire
department of any municipal corporation in the state, irre»-
spective of the manner in which he is appointed or employed, --
n
—— » — » »<m .
Extra-territoriality and Interstate Commerce*- -»It will
be observed tnat Section 5223 states that an injured employee
working outside the State of Connecticut under an agreement
made in Connecticut is entitled to compensation according to
the laws of that state. Tnis involves the troublesome question
of extra-territoriality, the rules of which vary greatly in
each state. Extra-territoriality, however, is to be distin-
guished from interstate commerce; for, while a contract of em-
ployment made in Connecticut to perform work outside that state
is an example of extra-territoriality, an employee of a railroad
55
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engaged in interstate commerce would not "be covered by the
Connecticut Act even though his work never took him out of
the state. Section 5262 is very clear on this point. The
text is as follows: "This chapter shall not affect the lia-
bility of employers to employees engaged in interstate or for-
eign commerce, for death or injury, in case the laws of the
United States provide for compensation or for liability for
such death or injury." The law embodied in this brief section
has been the basis of considerable controversy regarding the
question as to whether or not the employee's rights were
ccvered by the federal act or by the Connecticut Act. For ex-
ample, in the case of Sullivan vs. the New York, New Haven
and Hartford Hailroad (105 Conn. 122; 134 Atlantic 795; 7 Conn.
Comp. Dec. II - 15) the court attempted to determine if the
plaintiff at the time of the aooident was engaged in interstate
transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be
practically a part of it. This the court decided is the proper
test for determining the matter. Again in Moran vs. the New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad (109 Conn. 94; 145 Atlantic
567; 8 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 00) the court declared that an
employee who was engaged in both classes of commerce at the
time of his injury, or in work incident to both, must find his
remedy in federal law.
Exceptions . --An employer of less than five regular em-
ployees does not regularly come within the Connecticut Compen-
sation Act; consequently if such an employer does not elect
to accept "Part B" of the Act the provisions of Section 5224
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do not apply and in an action for personal injury sustained
by one of his employees sucn employer would not be deprived
of his common law defenses. However, an employer of less
than five employees may accept "Part B" of the Act and thus
be relieved of the fear of damage suits at common law. Em-
ployers of casual workers are also similarly exempt as are
the employers of outworkers. A casual worker is defined in
Section 5223 as "one '.vhose employment is of a casual nature,
and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of tne
employer's trade or business". A waiter hired by a caterer
for one day was held to be a casual employee. The same sec-
tion of the Act referring to an outworker reads: " 'Outworker'
shall mean any person to wnom articles or material are given
to be treated in any way on premises not under the control
or management of tne person who gave them out". Prior to the
adoption of tne Act and during the course of public hearings
before the Judiciary committee of tne legislature the question
as to tne number of employees wnich an employer might nave
before he became subject to the compensation laws was fre-
quently debated. Professor Clyde Fisher of Wesleyan University
seems to have been prominent as an expert on social insurance
at these hearings. In answer to the question regarding the
minimum number of employees which would oring an employer
within the provisions of the Act, he answered that the mini-
mum would have to be set somewhere, the lower the better, but
he concluded that five employees was a reasonable minimum.
It is the opinion of the writer that this particular exemption
feature was a concession to the farmers of Connecticut who

t>8
frequently employed less than five laborers in the tobacco
fields on whom they were not willing to pay compensation in-
surance premiums. Some compensation laws specifically exempt
agricultural workers, though it is difficult to see any reason
in such exemption when one considers the amount of dangerous
agricultural machinery now in use. The Connecticut law, how-
ever, gets around the opposition which agricultural interests
might create by exempting employers of less than five.
Compensation for ffatal Injuries.—The Connecticut Act
uses the word "injury" in preference to "accident". An injury
need not be purely accidental to be a compensable injury; it
may be the result of an occupational disease. Occupational
diseases as well as accidents frequently result in death to
the workman. Compensation, therefore, is paid on account of
death resulting from an accident or an occupational disease
within two years from the date of the accident or the first
manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease. The
Connecticut Act provides for burial expenses amounting to
two hundred dollars, which is a more liDeral sum than that
which is paid for tne same purpose in many of the other states.
Compensation equal to one-half of the average weekly earnings
of the deceased at tne time of nis injury is paid to his de-
pendents for a period of three hundred and twelve weeks. The
minimum amount payable weekly is five dollars and the maximum
amount so payable is twenty-one dollars.
Compensation for Total Incapacity. --An injured employee
who is totally incapacitated is entitled to compensation amount-
ing to one-half of his average weekly earnings at the time of
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the injury during the period of total incapacity; hut if the
employee is totally incapacitated for life he shall not receive
compensation for more than five hundred and twenty weeks. The
minimum and the maximum weekly compensation payments are the
same as those for fatality, five dollars and twenty-one dollars,
respectively.
Section 5236 considers the following-described injuries
as causing total incapacity:
(a) Total and permanent loss of sight in both eyes,
or the reduction to one-tenth or less of normal vision with
glasses.
(b) The loss of both feet at or above the ankle,
(o) The loss of both hands at or above the wrist.
(d) The loss of one foot at or above the ankle and
one hand at or above the wrist.
(e) Any injury resulting in permanent and complete
paralysis of the legs or arms or of one leg and one arm.
(f) Any injury resulting in incurable imbecility
or insanity.
The Connecticut Act, then, gives the injured employee
who is totally incapacitated for life one-half of his average
earnings for a period of ten years. Unquestionably this is
very much more than the average victim of the industrial
tragedy would have received under the archaic rules of common
law; but what becomes of this poor unfortunate after the ten
years during which he received compensation have expired?
This is one of the many questions which the advocates of a
complete system of social insurance must answer in the very near
future.
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Compensation for Partial Incapacity .--?aymerit for partial
incapacity is made in accordance with a scale based upon the
table of benefits given in Appendix B« The same principle
which is employed in connection with compensation payments
for a fatality or for total incapacity is also used here: One-
half the average weekly earnings, with a minimum of five dollars
a week and a maximum of twenty-one dollars a week. There is
difference, however, when an injured employee is able to return
to work at any time before the end of the period for which com-
pensation is payable, he is to receive compensation equal to
half of the difference between his average weekly earnings be-
fore the injury and the amount he is able to earn thereafter.
In the table in Appendix B the writer has attempted to show
the actual cash indemnity for various injuries, giving both
the maximum and the minimum in every case. A serious consider-
ation of the actual amount of benefit which the worker may
derive from the sums given in this table and the permanent
physical detriment which he must sustain for life will provide
the serious student of social problems with considerable food
for thought.

CHAPTER IX
RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE ACT
The employee as well as the employer has very
definite responsibilit ies under the Connecticut Workmen's
Compensation Act . If he is to "be the recipient of the "ben-
efits which the Act provide for him in case of distress he
must comply with certain minimum regulations set forth in
the law. The two chief requisites with which he must comply
-are: first, to give notice to his employer cf the in.iury
received; and secondly, to submit to any reasonable requests
which his employer or his employer's insurer may make regard-
ing physical examinations.
Notice of In
.1ury . - -Re gar d in g the primary responsibility
of the employee to give notice to his employer of the injury
sustained the Connecticut Statute states: "Any employee who
shall have sustained an injury in the course of his employ-
ment shall forthwith notify his employer, cr some person
representing him, of such injury; and, on his failure to
give uch notice, the commissioner may reduce the award of
compensation proportionately to any prejudice which he shall
find the employer has sustained by reason of such failure;
but the burden of proof with respect to such prejudice shall
rest upon the employer". *
The language of the Act is quite clear in the part of
* The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1951, Section 5232.
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Section 5232 which is quoted above. Yet a number of cases
went to the Supreme Court of Errors on an appeal from the
interpretaticn of the law embodied therein. In Hall vs.
La Courcier (95 Conn. 1; 104 Atlantic 348; 2 Conn. Comp.
Dec. II - 510) the court ruled that when an employee failed
to give the requisite notice to his employer "because he
considered medical aid to be unnecessary he did not lose
his rights.
It is not necessary that notice be given in writing,
nor does it seem that such a formal requirement is con-
templated by the wording of Section 5232. This point, how-
ever, was contested until the Supreme Court of Errors in
the case of Simmons vs. Holcomh ( 98 Conn. 776; 120 Atlantic
510; 5 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 28) decided that the notice
need not he in writing.
This section of the statute is quite clear in stating
that the notice need not he given directly to the employer.
It may he given to "some person representing him". Again
the Supreme Court of Errors had to lay down a decision on
that point in Palumho vs. Fuller. * In this case the court
held that failure to give notice to direct employer does not
release a principal who had notice.
The statute is also quite clear on the point that even
though the employee failed to give notice to his employer,
the employee is still entitled to compensation in the ab-
sence of such notice, provided his employer could not show
* 99 Conn. 353; 122 Atlantic 63; 5 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 20

that he had sustained any prejudice as a result of this
negative conduct on the part of his workman. This rule
was handed down in the Supreme Court case of Bongialotte
vs. Eines Company. * It was further shown in Thompson vs.
Towle (98 Conn. 740; 120 Atlantic 505; 5 Conn. Comp. Dec.
II - 20) that a similar failure on the part of the employee
to give notice does not deprive him of medical expenses
unless prejudice may he proved. In this particular instance
it is easy to see how a workman's failure to report a minor
injury may be accompanied "by his neglecting to use the cor-
rect or any type of medication, in which case infection may
develop and later even an amputation may become necessary.
Loss of life may then result from neglecting to attend im-
mediately to an injury which if properly treated might have
been classed as a minor casualty. In such an instance it
seems manifestly unfair to the employer to saddle him with
all the costs, especially vhen he stood ready to provide
proper medical treatment as soon as he was notified of the
injury. It is this type of situation, exemplifying neglect
on the part of the employee and spelling detriment to the
employer, which the statute attempts to guard against in
its reference to any prejudice hich the employer may sus-
tain. Yet, placing the burden of proof in such instances
upon the employer gives the workman the protection he needs,
especially when he is opposed in his claim by the legal ex-
* 97 Conn. 551; 117 Atlantic 696; 4 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 81.
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perts of the insurer.
Submission to Medical Examination .—Inasmuch as the
Act is very definite regarding the responsibility of the
employ -r to furnish immediately all requisite medical and
surgical aid as well as hospital service, it is equally
definite in placing the responsibility on the employee of
accepting the appropriate medical and surgical aid or hos-
pital service. In Section 5232 there is not only the state-
ment that the employee should accept the aid given, but in
the absence of medical and surgical aid or hospital service
it is stated that he is to provide these essentials for him-
self, the employer, of course, being held liable for their
cost. "If it shall appear to the commissioner that an in-
jured employee has refused to accept and failed to provide
such reasonable medical, surgical or hospital service, all
rights of compensation under the provisions of this chapter
shall be suspended during such refusal and failure." *
Furthermore, the employee may be called upon at any
time within reason at the request of the employer or at the
direction of the commissioner to submit to a medical examina-
tion. The examination must of course be conducted by a
reputable practicing physician or surgeon, provided and paid
by the employer ** or the insurer of the employer. The pur-
pose of sueh an examination is, of course, apparent. It may
not only be resorted to to determine the nature of the injury
* The Workmen 1 s Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5£32.
** Idem
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and the extent of the disability, hut if given some weeks
after the date cf the injury it is used as a follow-up on
the case, and also as a means of combating what the insurance
companies call malingering.
Again in Section 5248 the statute is emphatic in de-
claring the obligation of the workman to submit to any rea-
sonable medical examination. There can be little doubt
about the construction of the following quotation from Section
5248: "The refusal of an injured employee thus to submit
-himself to a reasonable examination shall suspend his right
to compensation during such refusal". * No supreme court
decision was necessary to affirm language as clear in its
specification as that quoted above.
Effect of Prior Disability .—The employer and his in-
surer are adequately protected against unjust claims on the
part . f employees by the rovisions embodied in Section 5267
of the Act, if such claims arise as the result of an injury
the employee has sustained which was due to a physical de-
fect that the employee had prior to his employment. The
provisions of this section also apply to an employee who sus-
tained an injury outside his employment which resulted in
his having a physical defect. In this situation where the
employee has such a physical defect which was not caused by
his regular work, if he later becomes injured on the job be-
cause cf that physical disability with which he was encumbered,
the employer or his insurer is relieved of all liability for
The Y,orkraen*s Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5248
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injuries di.ectly attributable to the employee's prior
physical disability.
Yaivers.—This provision in the law, however, is not
an automatic one, "but is dependent upon the employer's secur-
ing a signed waiver from the employee of the employee's right
or those of his dependents as affected "by this provision. In
case of a dispute regarding the extent to which the prior
physical disability caused the later injury, the commissioner
having jurisdiction is to decide whether or net the later in-
jury was attributable in a material degree to the prior physical
defect
.
In order to facilitate the settlement of dis utes arising
out of such situations and to obviate considerable litigation
in such cases very definite requirements regarding the form
for such waivers are carefully prescribed by the Act. For ex-
ample, no waiver becomes effective unless the defect in question
is plainly described therein, nor until the commissioner is
certain that the workman who signed such waiver fully under-
stood its meaning. The writer had an opportunity to see the
extent to which the commissioner and his assistants go to be
certain that the employee realizes the full importance of the
waiver before signing it. During the course of one of his visits
to that commissioner's office he saw at first hand the smooth
working of several of the provisions embodied in the Act. He
was greatly impressed by the unofficiousne ss , the informality,
the patience, the courtesy, of the small but efficient personnel
of this office. Here indeed are public servants — public ser-
vants in the highest sense which that title implies, much more
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over-v.orked than over -paid. It was net difficult to see that
this commissioner and the two women assisting him were working
for considerably more than their salaries — working hard with
out question to help make life a little lets harsh, a little
less painful for the mass of common workmen, many of whom
came to them with their fears and their injuries and with the
confidence of a child in the willingness and ability of these
kind public officials to help them. It is easy, then, to see
how the commissioner and his loyal assistants feel somewhat
repaid
•
If the employee who has sustained a prior physical
disability is a minor, one cf the parents or a guardian must
have given approval to the waiver in writing before it ill
become effective. Finally, the effectiveness of any such
waiver depends upon the discreti .nary powers of the commis-
sioner who must have approved such waiver in writing and
furnished each of the parties interested with a copy of his
approval on the proper form provided for that purpose.
Such precise and careful construction of this section
of the statute has not only served to protect the employer
against unjust claims for which he could not fairly be held
liable, and tc establish responsibility on the part of the
employee for his physical condition prior to his employment
and outside the job, but it has also served to eliminate
endless disputes arising out of such situations by the
clarity with which the conditions are expressed. The fact
that there are no supreme court rulings quoted on the law
embodied in Section 5267 of the Act is an eloquent testimony
to its unmistakable language and equal law.
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Position of ITinors and Incompetent Persons . —In the
preceding section of this chapter we saw that minors must
have the written consent of a parent or guardian to give
effect to a waiver concerning any physical disability vith
which they may he "burdened. Section 5258 treating of "Action
for Minors and Incompetents" lays down as a general principle
the rule that any employee who is a minor or mentally incom-
petent who is effected by the Act will have a parent or
guardian acting in his behalf , the acts ~f 1 horn shall be
construed as if the minor or otherwise incompetent person
had performed these acts, while capable of activity in his
own behalf. This, of course, is good law and quite the
customary procedure for situations in which minors and
mental incompetents may be involved. The principle is in
no way peculiar to compensation law, but is well applied
in industrial accident cases.
In order to protect the minor or mentally incompetent
person further, the commissicner is empowered by the text
to authorize or direct the payment of compensation directly
to a minor or to some responsible person other than the parent
or guardian whom the minor shall nominate, such nomination
to be subject to the approval of the commissicner.
It will be seen, then, that the subjects covered in
this chapter very definitely define the responsibilities of
the employee with reference to the operation of the Act.
While none of the requirements treated in this relation are
unreasonable, they do serve to establish a certain sense of
responsibility on the part of the employee in his legal re-
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lat ions hip to the statute which is primarily enacted to
assure him a certain measure of relief from the distressing
situations arising out of the physical dangers inherent in
his occupation. None cf these requirements, however, are
unreasonable nor difficult for a worker of low intelligence
to follow; yet, they serve to protect employers from unjust
claims which might otherwise arise. The small -percentage
of cases carried to the courts stand as indisputable testi-
mony to the hard work, the impartiality, and the intelligent
understanding cf the varied and conflicting elements in-
volved on the part of the district commissioners who dis-
charge their arduous, though intensely interesting, tasks
without ostentation and without the knowledge on the part
of a large proportion of the community of the splendid work
which these officials are doing to relieve the community of
problems which would otherwise be thrust upon it.

CHAPTER X
THE WAITING PERIOD
Warren H* Pillsbury, Compensation Expert for the
California Industrial Accident Commission, writing on Work-
men's Compensation in "Modern American Law" states: "The
word 'compensation 1 is a misnomer, as an injured workman is
never fully compensated for the loss sustained by him. It
is intended merely that the payments tide him over his period
of adversity". * Payments which he does not receive, however,
cannot very well tide him over; for an almost universal prin-
ciple in American compensation law is the employment of the
waiting period.
With the exception of Oregon and Porto Rico, wnere no
waiting period has been written into tne law, all tne Ameri-
can states which nave a compensation law nave adopted the prin-
ciple of the waiting period. With the two exceptions mentioned
above the waiting period varies in tne individual states from
three days to two weeks. In Connecticut tne waiting period
is one of seven days duration.
Retroactive Feature. --A considerable number of the
states have a retroactive feature in connection with tne wait-
ing period. The retroactive feature in the states having one
runs from two to eight weeks. Tne Connecticut Act in Section
5233 provides for such a retroactive provision, for which the
time is four weeks. It will be ooserved tnat in regard to
5 Modern American Law 111-37
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both the number of days in the waiting period and the length
of time which the disability must run before the retroactive
provision applies, the Connecticut law strikes the mean be-
tween the maximum and minimum duration of time for all states
which have a compensation code.
An illustration will serve to make the meaning of
Section 5233 more clear. If a workman is incapacitated as
a result of an injury received arising out of and in the
course of his employment, he is not entitled to any part of
his wages for the first seven days of his disability, if
his disability continues for eight days he would be compensated
according to schedule ror one day only, however, if his in-
capacity continued for a period of four weeks or longer, tne
compensation which he would receive would be based upon the
same scnedule, but the time for which he would receive compen-
sation would date from the day of his injury. This retroac-
tive provision embodied in the Connecticut lav/ and the laws
of many other states seems manifestly more Just than lews
which are not retroactive in this respect. Section 5233 of
the Connecticut Act further specifies that the injured em-
ployee shall be entitled to full wages for the entire day on
which ne sustained the injury. The day of the accident, then,
will not be counted as one of the days of incapacity; conse-
quently, the waiting period does not begin to run until the
day following the accident.
Historical Origin. --Historically » the waiting period
comes into American compensation codes from England where it
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is customary to sxempt the employer from the liability for
any injury which does not disable the employee for at least
one week. If the incapacity lasts less than two weeks, the
employer is exempt from this first week of the incapacity,
hut if the incapacity lasts longer than two weeks, the pay-
ments for disability date from the day of the injury. * But
this theory of the waiting period developed in England under
conditions quite different from those in the United States,
chief of which was the existence of Friendly Societies.
These societies to which the workers contributed extended
their sickness benefits to the victims of industrial accidents
for a time at least equal to the waiting period, after which
the compensation provisions functioned. Hence, there was no
actual hardship imposed upon the disabled by the waiting
period, and the circumstances giving rise to this theory were
vastly different from those which prevail in Connecticut or
in most of our American states.
Amer i can Writers on the Waiting Period .—Am e ri can
writers attempt to justify the waiting period for a number
of fairly good reasons. Blanch ard, writing in 1917 says:
"Its purpose is to exclude unimportant injuries and to pre-
vent malingery. In a multitude of cases where disability
lasts for a few hours or days the cost of administration
of compensation benefits would be disproportionately large
in comparison with benefits and would result in a net social
loss. Th-vs part makes unnecessary the exclusion of a large
RHODES, J. E. , "Workmen's Compensation", p. 141.

class cf accidents, which make a considerable showing in
the aggregate, but which are of little importance in the
individual case". * This opinion of Blanchard f s is typical
of the American writers who are more or less closely as-
sociated with insurance, Blanchard believes that if the
period is too short it will tempt the workman to prolong
his period of idleness in order to secure payment of bene-
fits; and if it is too long an undue burden of loss will be
imposed on him. This writer, apparently subscribes to the
theory of the waiting period, but concludes that it should
not be longer than two weeks.
Michelbacher and Nial , insurance executives, discus-
sing the waiting period feel that legislators may use this
principle to augment the benefits in fatal cases or those of
severe injury, although this could be accomplished anyhow by
slightly higher premium rates. "The injured man", says the
Vice-President of the Great American Indemnity Company and
his co-author, "can do without compensation payments for a
short time". ** Unquestionably a man drawing a vi ce -president's
salary can, but this theory is questioned seriously by the
writer when applied to an underpaid millhand. Certainly, the
existence of his injury will not serve to compensate the land-
lord or grocer during the waiting period. According to this
view the waiting period in theory may very well become a wait-
ing period in fact, in which the eighteen-dollar-a-week laborer
and his family actually wait for some nourishing food to sus-
* BLAUCHARD, R. H.
,
"Liability and Compensation Insurance",
p. 114
** MICHELBACHER and NIAL,
"WnrkTr.prn » o + •
p. 148 • vv °rJane s Compensation Insurance",
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tain them. Yet, it is true, though not necessarily relevant
to social justice, that the waiting period reduces the cost
of administration, as, according to the same writers, approx-
imately forty per cent of all injuries caused disability of
one week or less. The same writers also feel that the wait-
ing period tends to prevent fraud on the part of the injured
employee. The writer of this thesis, however, cannot subscribe
to the idea that the average workman would be satisfied to ac-
cept a percentage of his wages rather than the full wage in
order that he might stay out of work two or three days if
there were no waiting period and compensation dated from the
day of the injury. "In this way", write Michelbacher and Nial,
"he would be able to take advantage of his injury to spend
a part of the period of his alleged disability on vacation". *
Surely, jamming one f s hand is not a very pleasant prerequisite
for an enjoyable vacation. These casualties are hardly within
the scope of an insurance vice-president's experience. Can it
be that high insurance officials are so totally unacquainted
with the everyday lives of the millions of workers which their
compensation policies affect that they think a workman will
welcome a smashed member for a few days* painful leisure at a
percentage of his wages? The writer is convinced that they are.
If it be thought that the writer is too sympathetic with
the employee on the question of the waiting period, perhaps,
the reference to authority will show that his attitude is quite
* MICHELBACHER and NIAL , "Workmen* s Compensation Insurance",
p. 148
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consistent with that of I. M. Rubinow, who is, perhaps, America's
most scholarly writer on social insurance. Discussing the wait-
ing period Rubinow writes: "The problem of compensation for
the very large number of petty accidents has received a great
deal of attention in European discussions. A very large propor-
tion of accidents are quite petty, leading to a disability of
a very few days only. Evidently it is a great advantage, from
an administrative point of view especially, if these accidents
are kept out of the compensation system, at least as far as the
granting of financial aid is considered. Fewer accidents need
to be investigated and adjudicated. On the other hand, even a
short disability means some loss to the wage -worker, which he
must rightfully resent. It is unfair to him to saddle upon him
a loss which may have a perceptible influence upon his comfort.
The problem is met in a very effective way in Germany, Austria
and Hungary, and Russia, four countries having compulsory sick-
ness insurance in addition to the accident compensation system.
In these countries only accidents of a certain degree of gravity
are handled by the compensation system — fatal accidents, all
cases of permanent disability, and of temporary disability over
a certain fairly long period — thirteen weeks in Germany, ten
weeks in Hungary, and four weeks in Austria, the minor accidents
being taken care of by the sickness -insurance organizations". *
The waiting period in several of the European countries
may be worth mentioning as comparison. The period is six days
* RUBINOW, I. M. , "Social Insurance", pp. 118-119
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in Finland, four in Prance, three in Austria and Hungary, two
in Netherlands, and in Italy and Spain, where the shortening
of the waiting time became an issue successfully fought "by the
workingmen, it has been eliminated entirely.

CHAPTER XI
THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
Legal and Medical Fees* --While the waiting period with
reference to the payment of compensation is a recognized prin-
ciple of the law in Connecticut as well as in most other states,
there is no waiting period governing tne employer's supplying
all the requisite medical aid. Such a regulation, of course,
would defeat the very purpose of the system and ultimately run
up expenses far higher than those incurred when unlimited medi-
cal aid is immediately rendered. Ihe prolongation of the ill-
ness resulting from the injury would not only be common, but
dangerous infections or other complications might set in if
the workman were not treated immediately for his injuries or
ailments*
In recognition of these facts the Connecticut Act in
the same section in which it places tne responsibility upon
the injured employee to give notice of his injury to nis em-
ployer also states that "the employer, as soon as he shall
have knowledge of any such injury, shall provide a competent
physician or surgeon to attend to the injured employee, and in
addition shall furnish such medical and surgical aid or hos-
pital service as such physician or surgeon shall deem reason-
able or necessary". * But it seems to the writer that this
provision for medical aid is a bit futile when no similar
provision is made to provide food for the injured workman or
his family during the period of his incapacity*
The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5232
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To thoroughly protect the employee, under the provisions
of the same section, the employee is empowered to provide the
necessary medical care for himself at the employer's expense
if the employer has failed in his obligation in this respect.
In such a case the employer may not later compel the employee
to change his physician, surgeon, or hospital, unless the com-
missioner specifically orders or approves such change. However,
if the injured employee without good reason refuses the medical
and hospital service furnished "by his employer, although this
will not defeat his right to compensation, it will automatical-
ly make him liable for his own hospital and medical fees and
expenses. The commissioner, however, may authorize or direct
a change of physician, surgeon, or hospital, if he feels that
the injured employee is not being competently or adequately
oared for.
There have been a number of appealed cases on points
of law raised by this section. The chief point raised in these
cases was the extent to which the employer is responsible for
the various degrees of medical service furnished, the general
rule being that the pecuniary liability of the employer for
medical and surgical service shall be limited to charges which
prevail in the same or similar communities for similar treat-
ment of injured persons of a like standard of living to that
of the injured person, when such persons pay their own ex-
penses. For example, if the workman were to incur an injury
outside his occupation and as a result was confined to a ward
in a local hospital at his own expense, should he incur a sim-
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ilar injury on the job, he would not he entitled to a private
room in the hospital or to other acoomraodati ons more elaborate
than that with which he might provide himself in the first in-
stance. An artificial leg, however, has been held to be a
legitimate medical service to be provided by the employer *
and an osteopath is a physician within the meaning of the
Connecticut Act. ** All fees of attorneys, physicians, or
other persons for service rendered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act may be made subject to the approval
Of the commissioner. This provision, however, specified in
Section 5259 is merely in case of a dispute regarding such
fees. Usually such matters are adjusted by the employer's
insurer and do not reach the commissioner too frequently. The
writer understands that attorney's fees are almost always a
private matter between attorney and client when an injured
employee engages an attorney, and the commissioner will not
interfere with such private arrangements. If, however, an
employer complains of an extortionate attorney's fee, the com-
missioner has the power to disapprove such fee.
The Time and Manner of PaymentA—The commissioner has
the power to order the particular times in the week and the
manner in which compensation may be paid, which shall be paid
to the persons entitled to receive them or to those entitled
* Olmstead vs. Lamphier - 93 Conn. 21; 104 Atlantic 488;
2 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 151.
** Towers vs. Glider & Levin - 101 Conn. 169; 125 Atlantic 366;
5 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 103.
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to act for such persona. Tne commissioner may also direct
the commutation of such weekly sums into monthly or quarterly
payments, or with a single lump sum or approve agreements to
such effect if ne deem it wise and Just; no such agreements,
now ever, will be binding without his approval, 'i'nis excel-
lent feature of the Act is intended to protect the injured
party from making an agreement for a settlement which would
ultimately be to hie disadvantage. In elrery cuc^ ©f commuta-
tion the period of incapacity must be found, end it must alEO
oe shown that it is Just or necessary to commute. An example
of the necessity for commutation and the Justice prompting
such an agreement might well be tne case of an employee, unable
to return to his trade because of nis injuries, who had an op-
portunity to set up a news-stand or other business where his
ability to earn would not be materially affected by his in-
capacity. The writer is informed that it is the practice
among some insurance companies to pay compensations weekly
rather than monthly when the injured employee may call for the
payment in person. If, now ever, payment is made by mail or
to a dependent out of the state or country the insurer prefers
to pay Dy the month or less frequently to save mailing ex-
penses and expenses incidental to taxes on checks.
Average Wages as Bases for Computation.—Compensation
payments for any given number of weeks during which compensa-
tion is to be paid are based upon a unit called the "average
weekly earnings". In all cases for which compensation is paid
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one -half the average weekly earnings is the amount so paid
according to a schedule of "benefits commensurate with the
fatality, total or partial incapacity sustained.
The average weekly wage is ascertained in the follow-
ing manner: The total wages received "by the injured workman
from the employer in whose service he was injured are computed
for the twenty-six calendar weeks immediately preceding his in-
jury or the numher of those weeks during which he worked. This
sum is then divided "by twenty-six if he worked all twenty-six
weeks or by the number of weeks of the twenty-six during which
he did work. Some such system is necessary to establish a
basis for computing the average weekly earnings of a host of
employees, some cf whom are paid by the week, others by the
day cr hour, and still others at a piece rate. An example of
the application of this method might be the following: A
machinist v orking at piece rates in a factory, where he had
been employed for some time prior to twenty-six weeks before
the accident, was out of work one week in the half year preced-
ing the accident. During the twenty-six week period prior to
his injury working at piece rates he had earned a total of
$615. His average weekly earnings would then be the quotient
when $615 was divided by twenty-five, as the week during w hi ch
he earned nothing is not to be included in the divisor. It
will be seen that his average weekly wage would be $24.60.
The computation he would receive would be based upon that fig-
ure. According to the statute he would be entitled to one -half
his average weekly earnings, or in this case $12.30 a week for
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a given number of weeics in accordance with the benefit schedule
outlined in Section 5237 if the injury resulted in partial in-
capacity only. Suppose tne workman's injury resulted in nis
losing the first phalanx of the second finger of his right hand
according to Section 5237 he would receive $12.30 lor ten weeks
or $123 in all. His medical, surgical, and hospital expenses
would be entirely paid for by the employer or nis employer's
insurer. *Ve need not enter into a discussion of tne merits of
the benefit schedule at this point. Twelve dollars and tnirty
cents is considerably better tnan notning in the case mentioned
but one cannot help reflecting that our compensation laws still
have a long way to go in their attempt to attain a greater mea-
sure of social justice for the victims of industrial accidents.
Surely, it cannot be questioned that the ability of the piece
rate worker in this example to earn a decent wage would have
been greatly impaired as a result of his accident. While the
compensation was paid for ten weeks and during that time it
will aid to mitigate the loss in earning power sustained, the
loss of a part of tne workman's finger is a detriment wnich ne
must sustain for life and one which may immediately unfit him
for the Job at which he was making a fair wage prior to his in-
jury. Certainly tne ability to make a decent week's pay under
a piece rate system is dependent upon speed and efficiency on
the part of the workman and theEe requisites urgently call for
his naving all members unimpaired.
deferring again to Section 5238, if the workman nas been
employed for a net period of less tnan two calendar weeks prior
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to nis injury, nis weekly wage is considered to be equivalent
to the average weekly wage prevailing in the same or similar
employment in the same locality at the time of nis injury*
In the case of a minor unaer eighteen years of age
whose future earning power may nave been greatly and premature-
ly impaired, the commissioner is empowered to ado fifty per
centum to such minor's average weekly wage. This provision
is commendable in its attempt to write the proper spirit into
the law when it recognizes even to this limited extent the
obligation of Industry to the youths wnom its mechanical
techniques have made less capable of taking their place in
the struggle for existence in a highly competitive society.
Provisions for Dependents. --When the employee's injury
results in his deatn, payment of compensation is made to his
dependents in accordance with a scale of benefits discussed
in Chapter VIII. Section t>235 of the Connecticut Act defines
dependency and distinguishes total from partial dependence.
The following persons are conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent for support upon a deceased employee: "(a) A wife
upon a husband with wnom she lives at the time of his injury
or from whom she receives support regularly; (b) a husband
upon a wife wi th whom he lives at the time of her injury or
from wnom he receives support regularly; (c) any child under
the age of eighteen years, or over said age but physically
or mentally incapacitated rrom earning, upon tne parent with
whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regular-
ly at the time of the injury of such parent, there being no
surviving dependent parent. In case there shall oe more than

84
one child tnus dependent, the death Denefit shall be divided
equally among them". *
If at the time of the injury which resulted in a
fatality there is more than one person wholly dependent upon
the deceased, as a wife and a mother, for example, the statute
states that the compensation shall oe divided equally among
them, snd if there are also persons partially dependent in
addition to the two persons wno are totally dependent, those
persons partially dependent will not receive compensation.
The theory implied in this provision is to the effect tnat
anyone who is only partially dependent ana therefore somewhat
self-supporting will ue Detter able to adjust nimself to a
position of independence than those wno are totally dependent
wno therefore cannot very well be deprived of the compensa-
tion they would receive.
The dependence of a widow or a widower of a deceased
employee automatically terminates with their remarriage. If,
however, tnere are otner dependents, upon tne remarriage of
the dependent widow or widower, compensation shall continue
to be paid to such other dependents or tne deceased employee
during the period during which such compensation is payable.
With the exception of a child wno is physically or
mentally incapacitated from earning tne presumptive depen-
dence of the child terminates when he reaches the age of
eighteen years.
The Workmen^ Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section t>£35
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If tne deceased employee nas anyone who is totally
dependent upon him at tne time of the fatality, even though
such dependents are non-resident aliens, they will receive
compensation. .But if in addition to such alien dependents
tne deoeased shall have some person or persons in tne State
of Connecticut who are dependent in fact, as a wife, for ex-
ample, the commissioner may equitably apportion the sums pay-
able as compensation between the deceased's alien dependents
and the widow who resides in Connecticut.
The subject-matter of Section 5235 under discussion
has provided material for considerable controversy, there be-
ing no less than twelve cases in wnich an appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court of Errors on the questions of law implied in
this section of the Act. Some of the questions which the
Supreme Court ruled upon involved a consideration of the fol-
lowing: Wnen is the father dependent? When is the mother de-
pendent? In tne case of Draus vs. The International Silver
Company 1105 Conn. 415; 135 Atlantic 437; 7 Conn. Comp. Dec.
II - 38) the status of a mother's dependency was determined
to be the amount which the deoeased had contributed to ner
support wnile living, and that amount was held to oe the amount
of her dependency irrespective of what her board costs. In
MacDonald vs. Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company 195 Conn. lbO;
III Atlantic t>5; 3 Conn. Comp. Deo. II - 77) it was held that
a person cannot be said to be a dependent wnen there are suf-
ficient means at hand for supplying his or her necessities.
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In another case * a mother of the deceased was held to he
dependent within the statute although the deceased had made
no contribution toward her support prior to the fatality.
Obviously, the fact that he was legally compelled to con-
tribute to her support, although never forced to do so, was
sufficient justification for considering her a de-pendent
within the meaning of the statute. Apparently the dependent
in this case was supported prior to her son's accident "by a
relative who had no actual legal obligation to assume such
responsibility, but upon the death of the son such relative
attempted to invoke the statute to be relieved of the obliga-
tion which he had voluntarily assumed. All of the claims,
however, which dependents have made and which were contested
by the employer were not strictly within the meaning of the
statute and consequently were not allowed by the Supreme Court
of Errors. For example, in Atwood vs. Connecticut Light and
Power Company (95 Conn. 669; 112 Atlantic 269; 4 Conn. Comp.
Dec. II - 13) the plaintiff contended that the fact that the
deceased had contributed money which was used for the purchase
of a house by the plaintiff's parent made him a dependent;
but the Court ruled otherwise.
* Mazzie vs. Lavitt - 112 Conn. 233; 152 Atlantic 144; 9 Conn,
Comp. Dec. II

CHAPTER XII
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
Workmen's Compensation law is so different in tne
situations which it attempts to solve and so specialized in
its character that an entirely different type or legal admin-
istration is necessary in cases arising out of industrial
accidents. With tne exception of eight states and the
Territory of Alaska, workmen's compensation cases are not
primarily decided oy the court. The most usual practice
is to submit such oases for arbitration to a single commis-
sion or board which specializes in this type of work. Thirty
states and Porto Rico follow this metnod. Connecticut, Iowa,
New lork, Rhode Island and Hawaii each have a system of ad-
ministration differing from each other and somewhat different
from the single commission or court tribunal whicn prevails
in the vast majority of states.
The Commission. --In Connecticut there are five compen-
sation commissioners, one for eacn of the five congressional
districts in the state. In tne vast majority of the cases
whicn he is called upon to decide, each commissioner acts
independently of the others, and the powers of a commissioner
are rather wide and inclusive. It will be seen from the fore-
going discussion that the range of the commissioner's powers
in disputes arising in the territory over which he has juris-
diction are very great indeed. He is called upon to exercise
a great amount of discretion and Judgment on matters pertain-
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ing to the compensation law, which in many cases are ex-
tremely tecnnieal and hignly involved. Hot only must ne
be well versed in every provision of tne elaborate compen-
sation statute, but ne must also be familiar with industrial
conditions, conditions surrounding the safety of workers in
tne many and varied factories which are located within his
Jurisdiction. His knowledge of medical questions pertain-
ing to injuries, which tne worker may receive, and otner
circumstances surrounding the worker botn on nis job and
outside, must be detailed and will naturally call for a
staggering amount of specialized information, it is easy
to see how an official devoting all his time to adjusting
the problems arising out of industrial accidents can oecome so
much more efficient and, therefore, is of greater benefit
to the community which he serves than the average judge in
a law court would be in similar cases. The court is clut-
tered with so many different types of cases that it becomes
utterly impossiole for the judge on the bench to acquaint
himself with details as intricate as tnose with wnich the
commissioner is versed because nis work is of such a
specialized character.
Appointment and Tenure of Office. --On or Defore January
1 of each year the Governor of tne State of Connecticut is
empowered to appoint a competent person to be compensation
commissioner for one of tne five districts, the appointment
to be for a period of five years. Each year as tne term of
the commissioner of one of tne five districts expires the
governor may reappoint such a commissioner or name a successor.

If a vacancy should occur at any time during the five-year
term, the governor may also fill such a vacancy. Reappoint-
ment to this office, which is not so easily filled with com-
petent persons whose experience and training would fit them
for the difficult duties which they are called upon to exer-
cise, is quite common. If, however, a commissioner is not
properly discharging the duties of his office, the governor
may have him removed for good cause and the good of the pub-
lic service. The commissioner to be removed, however, must
first be given due notice and he is entitled to a public hear-
ing before removal if he demands it.
Any compensation commissioner who has ceased to hold
office may be permitted to settle and dispose of all matters
relating to appealed cases and to any other unfinished busi-
ness pertaining to cases heard by him. When acting in such
capacity he has the same powers as if he were still a compen-
sation commissioner.
Powers of Commissioners .— * The powers of a commis-
sioner in settling industrial accident cases are similar to
those of a judge in a law court. Each commissioner has the
power to summon and to examine under oath such witnesses as
are necessary to a just hearing of the case before him. He
may also require the production of books, records, vouchers,
memoranda, documents, letters, contracts, or other papers,
which have any bearing on the matter which he may be called
upon to adjust. If a commissioner should be temporarily in-
* The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5242
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capacitated from hearing any case he shall designate some
other commissioner to hear and decide such case, and the
power which he delegates shall he held hy the other commis-
sioner acting for him, and it shall he sufficient to give
such other commissioner complete jurisdiction over the mat-
ters so delegated. The orders of a compensation commissioner
when acting on the subject -matter within the meaning of the
Act and the scope of his powers are as mandatory as if they
were issued hy the Superior Court. The Superior Court on the
application of the commissioner will enforce by appropriate
decree or process any provision of the statute or any order
of a commissioner who was acting within the scope of his
authority.
Powers of the Commission.—When the five commissioners
act together as a hoard they are empowered to adopt and change
such rules or methods of procedure and forms as they shall con-
sider expedient for the purposes of carrying out the spirit
and letter of the Compensation Act. The commissioners are to
prepare and submit to the governor a biennial report of their
affairs. This report may also include any recommendations
which they think may serve to further the purposes for which
the compensation law was enacted.
Jurisdiction of Commissioners. --Secti on 5242 of the Act
specifies that the commissioner for the first congressional
district shall maintain an office at some convenient location
in the city of Hartford; the commissioner for the second
district an office similarly located in the city of Norvdch;
the commissioner for the third district in the city of New
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Haven; the commissioner for the fourth district in the city
of Bridgeport; and the commissioner for the fifth district
in the city of Waterbury. Each commissioner is required to
keep his office open during reasonable business hours of
every day except Sundays and legal holidays, hut he may hear
and decide cases at any other place within his district. The
usual practice is for the commissioner to reserve the morning
hours for the hearing of cases while the afternoon hours are
devoted to outside investigations on his part, during which
time his assistants are available at the office to answer
the many questions which employees and others may have re-
garding the multitude of situations over which the office has
jurisdiction.
Personnel of the Commission.—At the present the per-
sonnel of the commission consists of four attorneys and one
medical doctor. The advantage of this inclusion of a physician
is very obvious when the commission is acting as a board. When
the individual commissioners are acting independently, it has
been seen that a considerable knowledge of both law and of
medicine must be a part of each commissioner's equipment. At
the present time the Connecticut Compensation Commission is
composed of the follovdng personnel:
FREDERIC M. WILLIAMS
,
Commissioner for the Fifth Congressional
District and Chairman,
Office, Court House, Waterbury.
LEO J. NOONAN,
Commissioner for the First Congressional
District.
Office, 54 Church Street, Hartford
ALBERT J. BAILEY,
Commissioner for the Second Congressional
District.
Office, 43 Broadway. Norwich

92
CHARLES KLEINER,
Commissioner for the Tnird Congressional
District.
Office, 151 Court Street, New Haven
CHARLES S. WILLIAMSON,
Commissioner for the Fourtn Congressional
District,
Office, 955 Main Street, Bridgeport
It is tne opinion of tne writer that tne organization
of the Connecticut Compensation Commission into five commis-
sioners, who administer the law individually within their
Jurisdiction thus decentralizing the powers of a Doard, is
by far the best type of organization for tne settlement of
industrial accident cases. Any efficient officer, acting
alone, will act with a degree of speed and decision so nec-
essary in these cases. A board would not be capable of equal
efficiency. Tne very nature of committee organization calls
for compromise. The commissioners, naving a smaller territory
over wnich they exercise Jurisdiction, are in a position to
become thoroughly acquainted with tne industrial conditions
within their districts. Consequently, they are in a better
position zo get aoxion regarding the enforcement of safety
measures in the factories wnich come within their jurisdiction
than any board would be when acting as a centralized body with
an entire state to supervise. Tne discussion in the chapter
following relating to the procedure for settling cases will
serve to show to a greater extent the excellence of the type
of organization which Connecticut maintains for the enforce-
ment of its compensation laws.

CHAPTER XIII
SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES UltfDER THE ACT
The outstanding distinction between the settlement of
an industrial accident case before a compensation commissioner
and the adjudication of a negligence case under conditions
which prevail in the law court is chiefly one of simplifica-
tion of procedure. The formal and exaggerated dramatic back-
ground of the American Superior Court is reduced to one of a
simple and businesslike setting. There is no robed Judge, no
formal courtroom, and no jury. While the settlements reached
in that part of the commissioner's office which is set aside
for hearings are just as binding as if they were tried in
court, the very lack of ostentation and pomp accompanying the
informal procedure under the Compensation Act is the element
which permits a great number of cases to be speedily heard
and satisfactorily adjusted. As a matter of fact, this in-
formality of atmosphere is so marked that one may find him-
self in a commissioner's office for some little time before
he realizes that the particular arrangement of the railings,
desks, and the chairs are intended to make these objects serve
as bench, bar, and witness-stand. In questioning the staff
of one of the commissioners on this point the writer learned
that this effect was secured as a deliberate result of the
policy of the commissioners to make the atmosphere as infor-
mal and as natural as possible and thus to encourage the in-
jured workman to relate his story simply and clearly and with-
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out fear of intimidation. The writer was given to understand
that the employee is permitted to relate his story of the ac-
cident in his own way without interruption, even if he includes
the most irrelevant details. It will he noted that when a com-
miseioner takes this attitude in regard to the hearing of tes-
timony he is recognizing the newer and sociological principles
implied in the compensation law which call for a more or less
fair adjustment rather than for the proof of negligence. Fur-
thermore, this simplified procedure results in the speeding up
of the case. Many of the facts surrounding the accident are
readily admitted without the necessity of proof. The young
attorney who has had no experience with compensati on cases
frequently finds himself embarrassed when he attempts to prove
facts which to his surprise are immediately conceded at the
hearing.
Hearing of Claims . --All cases of industrial accidents,
however, need not he submitted to the commissioner for a hear-
ing. In ninety per cent of the cases the employer or his in-
surer adjust the matter in accordance with the provisions of
the compensation law without resorting to a hearing. It is
only when an injured employee and his employer or the employer's
legal representative fail to reach an agreement in regard to
compensation that a hearing is required. In such an instance
either party may notify the commissioner of the failure to
reach an agreement and upon such notice the commissioner will
set a date for a hearing, giving both parties notice of the
time and place. The usual length of time intervening between
the commissioner's notice and the hearing is approximately ten
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days. Tne commissioner is empowered to subpoena such wit-
nesses as may "be required and to allow them such fees and
traveling expenses as are allowed in a civil action, the cost
of which is to oe paid by the party in whose interests such
witnesses are subpoenaed. Both the employer and employee may
appear at the hearing either in person or by attorney or other
accredited representatives. Usually, if the employee is not
too seriously injured he will appear in his own behalf, while
tne adjuster of his employer's insurance company will appear
to defend tne claim. No formal pleadings are required beyond
certain informal notices which the commissioner may require,
and in all cases the hearings under the Act are conducted by
the commissioner in accordance with the rules of equity. He
is not bound by the ordinary common law procedure nor Dy
statutory rules of evidence or procedure. He uses nis judg-
ment in inquiring into the circumstances of the case, hearing
simple testimony and examining written and printed records
which may aid in nis arriving at a decision wnich will best
carry out the spirit of the Act. There are no entry fees or
charges to either party in connection with a hearing, but the
commissioner will furnish at cost certified copies of any
testimony, award, or other official matter in connection with
the case.
A superficial examination of the oases digested in the
"Connecticut Compensation Decisions" would lead one to believe
that the claimant is more successful if he engages counsel.
But a more complete scrutiny of the data presented in these
reports reveals that the reason for such a conclusion is due

to the fact that certain types of compensation cases, such
as one involving grinder's consumption, for instance, are
difficult to prove without the aid of legal counsel. This
type of case is also a higfcly contestable type of claim.
If an employee, seeking compensation, comes to the commis-
sioner's office and honestly states the facts of his case,
and if it appears to the commissioner or his assistants that
such a claimant would benefit by retaining counsel, he is ad-
vised to engage an attorney. As the nature of compensation
cases is vastly different from that of the routine practice
of the average lawyer, if the claimant has no lawyer of his
own, the office of the commissioner will furnish him with a
list of attorneys who make a specialty of this work. In
studying the compensation decisions one finds that most of
the cases are handled by a comparatively small number of such
specialists. He will observe that certain attorneys appear
for the claimant in some cases and for the insurer in others.
The writer discovered that this is due to the fact that these
lawyers are regularly retained by one or more insurance com-
panies in whose behalf they appear to defend claims and against
whom they cannot take a case. They are, however, with their
specialized ability available to represent a claimant whose
case is being contested by an insurance company whom they do
not represent. This accounts for their being at various times
on both sides of the fence.
Awards.—As soon as possible after the conclusion of the
hearing, the commissioner sends to each party a written copy

97
of his finding and award, filing a third copy in his office.
The original award is to he filed in the Office of the Clerk
of the Superior Court for the county in which the injury
occurred, unless such injury oocurred outside of the state,
in which case the original award would he filed in the Office
of the Clerk of the Superior Court in the county in which
the commissioner's office is located. If neither of the
parties file an appeal within ten days, the commissioner's
finding an award ?/ill he considered final and may he enforced
in the same manner as a judgment of the superior court, upon
which the court may issue an execution. If the employer's
insurer has heen unduly negligent in making payments, the com-
missioner may include in his award interest at six per centum
per annum.
Section 5251 which provides the statutory authority
for the above procedure has "been subject to considerahle
Judicial review in which no less than eighteen cases have he en
appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors. Some of the points
at issue have "been as follows: What should the finding con-
tain? What subordinate facts should the findings contain?
Was the finding inconsistent with evidence on both sides?
And in the case of Sehmitt vs. American Brass Company (109
Conn. 599; 145 Atlantic 154; 8 Conn. Comp. Dec. II - 000) it
was held that when an award has not been appealed from the
finding it becomes final on subsequent hearings for further
compens ation.
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Appeals .—Either party may appeal to the superior court
for the county in which the award was filed at any time within
ten days after entry of the commissioner's finding and award.
Upon the filing of the appeal the clerk of the county court is
to notify the appellee. To speed up actions appealed to the
superior court from the commissioner's office these cases are
given precedence in respect to their assignment for trial over
all other actions except writs of habeas corpus and actions
brought by or on behalf of the state. Ordinarily, no costs
are taxed either party on any such appeal either in the superior
court or in the Supreme Court of Errors with the exception of
the record fee when a case is appealed to the Supreme Court of
Errors; but whenever any appeal from a finding and award of a
compensation commissioner shall be taken to the superior court
and it shall be found that such appeal was taken without gocd
reason for the purpose of causing delay, the court may tax the
party taking such frivolous appeal.
Considerably less than ten per cent of all awards made
by the commissioner are appealed to the superior court; there-
fore
,
lees than one per cent of all industrial accident cases
now reach the county courts, when previous to the adoption of
the Compensation Act they cluttered them. When an award is
appealed to the superior court, the clerk of that court is re-
quired to notify the commissioner from whose award the appeal
was taken. This notification must be in writing and the clerk
of the superior court is to further notify the commissioner of
any action of the court upon the appeal, and of the final dis-
position of the case, and to furnish the commissioner with a
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copy of the decision* The superior court cannot
,
however,
change a finding of a commissioner unless the commissioner has
found facts without evidence, or has reached an unreasonable
decision. *
* Battey vs. Osborne - 96 Conn. 633; 115 Atlantic 83; 4 Conn.
Comp. Dec. II - 48.

CHAPTER XIV
THE GUARANTEE OF ABILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION
Eaoh employer who has elected to become liable under
"Part B" of the Act must furnish the compensation commissioner
with satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability
to compensate injured employees or their dependents according
to the provisions of the Compensation Act. If any employer
is unable to so satisfy the compensation commissioner of nis
ability to make all payments required, he must file with the
insurance commissioner an acceptable form guaranteeing the
security necessary to the complete performance of all his
obligations toward injured employees; or ne may insure his
full liability in any Etock insurance company or employers 1
mutual association wnioh is authorized to accept such risks
in the State of Connecticut. *
Employers 1 Mutual Insurance.—In the vast majority of
oases the employer passes on nis liability to an insurance com-
pany organized to nandle the industrial accident case. More
frequently the risk is undertaken by a stock company, as tnis
type of insurer seems to be most popular in the United States.
"For example, the memoership list or the Uation&l Council on
Compensation Insurance includes a membership of forty-four stock
companies, twenty mutual companies, and four state funds. The
mutuals listed in tnis organization are relatively large asso-
ciations. Tne Connecticut Act under "Part C" provides for the
* The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5255
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formation of employers 1 mutual associations in the corporate
form without capital stock for the purpose of insuring the
liabilities of employers in accordance v;itn the provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Tne statute specifically states
that no mutual association shall be formed to include employers
who are not engaged in the same or similar trade or business
or in trades or businesses with substantially similar degrees
of hazard of injury to employees. * This type of associate on,
while not particularly ravored by employers in the united States,
is very popular in Germany, where tne compensation movement first
received its impetus. The strength of tnis type of organization
lies in the tendency on the part of its members to study the
causes of accidents, to make rules regarding tne safeguarding
of machinery, and to otherwise reduce the number of industrial
hazards wnich naturally increase the costs of production in tne
trade or industry. Sucn mutual associations frequently make
rules wnich impose fines on member employers who disregard mea-
sures of safety proposed by the association, thus increasing
the assessments of otner employers in the same association.
In Germany tnese associations have had a high degree of suc-
cess in compensation work and their limited extension in this
country can be due only to two reasons: First, the general in-
difference on the part of American manufacturers to the problems
arising out of the industrial accident; and secondly, to a busi-
* The Workmen's Compensation Act as Amended in 1931, Section 5271
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nesslike and aggressive attitude on the part of American stock
insurance companies who have "been ever ready to assume the risk
and take the burden completely off the shoulders of the American
manufacture rs.
Employers desiring to form a mutual association of the
type contemplated under "Part C" of the Act mu.~t first receive
the approval of the insurance commissioner, who may require such
employers to satisfy him that the association is well designed
and adequate for the purposes for which it was formed. The in-
surance commissioner is given Jurisdiction over all mutual as-
sociations, but the associations are empowered to make their
own by-laws to provide for admission, suspension, withdrawal
or expulsion of members, and to do many other things in con-
nection with the purpose for which they are organized. Further-
more, the mutual association has the right of appeal to the
superior court from any decision or order of the insurance
commissioner affecting the association.
Workmen's Compensation Insurance .— ''Part D" of the Act
prescribes the rules and regulations regarding the insurance
of the employer's obligation as defined in "Part B". Section
5283 which provides for the liability of the insurer to the
employee or his dependent states: " Whenever any employer of
labor as defined in this chapter shall insure his liability
under this chapter with any company authorized to transact a
compensation insurance business in this state, the contract of
insurance between such employer of labor and such insurer shall
be a contract for the benefit of any employee who shall sustain
an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment
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by such insured by reasons or the business operations sub-
scribed in the policy, while conducted at any working place
therein described, or elsewhere in connection therewith, or,
in the event of such injury resulting in death, for the bene-
fit of the dependents of such employee." As far as tne in-
surance company is concerned tne sec c ion of tne Act just
quoted is the effective compensation lav/, inasmuch as tne text
of thia section very definitely substitutes the liability of
the insurance company to tne injured employee. This section
.goes on to state tnat the insurer snail be directly and
primarily liable to the employee and, in the event of his
death the insurer shall be liable to nis dependents for all
compensation for which the employer is liable.
Even ir there were a breach of warranty or misrepresenta-
tion on tne part of the insured, the insurance company will
not be permitted to set up such breach or misrepresentation
as a defense available against an employee or nis dependent.
In other words every contract of insurance between an employer
and the insurer shall be conclusively presumed to cover the
entire liability of the employer in any proceeding before a
compensation commissioner or on an appeal from a commissioner's
award.
Reports Required or Insurer.—Every insurance company
wnich undertakes to write workmen^ compensation insurance
must report in writing to tne board of commissioners the name
of the person or corporation insured, the day on which the
policy becomes effective and the date of its expiration. Tnis
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report mast be made within one week from the date of the policy.
If a workmen's compensation policy is cancelled, cancellation
does not become effective until one week after the commissioner
has been notified of such cancellation.
To enforce the provisions of Section 5291, which prescribe
the rules Just set forth regarding tne notification of policies
issued and notice of their cancellation, the text of the same
section provides for the imposition of a fine upon any insurance
company which violates any of the above regulations. For each
violation the insurer may be fined not less than one hundred
nor more tnan one thousand dollars. These regulations quite
apparently protect the employee from technicalities which might
otherwise be raised by the insurance companies, giving rise
to a decided lack of security to the workman entitled to com-
pensation, and thus the very spirit of the Compensation Act
would be defeated. The legislators who drafted the provisions
of the Act, however, wisely visualized this possibility and
in writing the text of Section S291 they were successful in de-
feating any such possibility in the very last section of the
Act.
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CONCLUSION
After a fairly extensive study of the subject of
Workmen's Compensation with particular reference to tne
law in Connecticut, and a careful examination of tne his-
torical, legal, economic, and sociological backgrounds of
tnis field in tne United States and in foreign countries,
the writer of tnis tnesis nas arrived at tne following con-
clusi ons
:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act in Connecticut
compares favorably with similar codes in other
states.
2. It is similarly a specific vehicle for carry-
ing out by legal means one of the great prin-
ciples of social Justice — industrial acci-
dent compensation.
3. It results in a more socialized and equable dis-
tribution of the burden due to industrial acci-
dents than either common law rules or Employers'
Liability Laws.
4. Tne administration of tne Act in the nands of
tne compensation commissioners not only ap-
proaches the ideal for this type of adjust-
ment but it also forecasts an informal type
of procedure toward which our American courts

106
are heading, with a minimum of the theat-
rical and a maximum of equitable administra-
tion of Justice.
5, It tends to encourage accident prevention
with lower premium rates as the selfish
but, nevertheless, efficacious incentive.
While tne Workmen's Compensation Act in Connecticut
is a good code for the purpose for wnich it was enacted, it
could be made much more effective if tne following recommenda-
tions were carried out:
1. It should merely form a part of a comprehen-
sive scheme for a system of social insurance
which might well include sickness, old age
and invalidity insurance, as well as employ-
ment insurance and widow's pensions. With
Hartford functioning as the insurance capital
of the nation, it would seem that there is
plenty of actuarial talent available to the
development of such a scheme.
2. To make the administration of the Act more
effective the appropriation allotted the
five compensation commissioners should be
increased sufficiently to permit each com-
missioner to enlist the aid of a full-time
statistician to work out accident -prevention
measures and possibly an industrial phycholo-
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gist to direct and supervise the work of
the five statisticians throughout the state.
3. A series of publicity releases to acquaint
the public with the work of the commissioners
and the provisions of the Act as well as an
educational program carried out in the form
of lectures on the principles of the compen-
sation law and safety psychology, given in
cooperation with progressive manufacturers
and labor unions.
4. The establishment of a state insurance fund
for workmen's compensation insurance as well
as for other forms of sooial insurance, which
as a competitor of private insurance corpora-
tions would at least spur them on to greater
efforts as ardent merchandisers of social in-
surance •
* The following states have established state funds which are
given a monopoly on workmen's compensation insurance: Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming,
The following states have established state funds wnich compete
with private insurance carriers for workmen's compensation in-
surance: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, Pennsylvania.
With a system established lor the appointment of officials similar
to that of the British Civil Service it seems ridiculous to be-
lieve that any of these states could not conduct workmen's com-
pensation at least as efficiently as a private insurance corpora-
tion.

APPENDIX A
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN EUROPE
States
Germany
Austria
Norway
Finland
Year of
Enactment
1884
1887
1894
1895
Great Britain 1897
Denmark 1898
Italy 1898
France 1898
Holland 1901
Sweden 1901
Belgium 1903
Switzerland 1912
Insurance
C or E
Compuls ory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Ele ctive
Elective
Compuls ory
Elective
Compulsory
Ele ctive
Elective
Compulsory
Choice of Insurance
Instituti on
Employer's Mutual
Associations only
Employer ' s Mutual
Associations only
Government only
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
P rivate Compan ie s
Mutual Associations
Government Institutions
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
Government Institutions
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
Government Institutions
Pr ivate Compan ie s
Mutual Associations
Government Institutions
Private Companies
Mutual Associations
Gove rnment only

JAPPENDIX B
COMPENSATION FOR PARTIAL INCAPACITY
Type of Injury
(a) Loss of one arm at or
above elbow
(b) Loss of one hand at or
above wrist
(c) Loss of one leg at or
above knee
(d) Loss of one foot at or
above ankle
(e) Loss of complete or per-
manent hearing in both
ears.
(f) Loss of complete or per-
manent hearing in one ear
(g) Loss of complete or per-
manent sight in one eye
(h) Loss of, or the complete
and permanent loss of,
the use of a thumb
fi) Loss of, or the complete
and permanent loss of,
the use of a first finger
or a great toe
(J) Loss of, or the complete
and permanent loss of,
the use of -
(1) Second finger
(2) Third finger
(3) Fourth finger
(k) Loss of, or the loss of
the use of, any toe ex-
cept the great toe*
No. Wks. Minimum* Maximum**
225
175
208
156
156
52
156
60
38
30
25
20
13
1125.00
875.00
1040.00
780.00
780.00
260.00
780.00
300.00
190.00
150.00
125.00
100.00
65.00
4725.00
3675.00
4368.00
3276.00
3276.00
1092.00
3276.00
1260.00
798.00
650.00
525.00
420.00
273.00
Obtained by multiplying number of weeks by $5.00
Obtained by multiplying number of weeks by &21.00

APPENDIX C
METHODS OP ADMINISTERING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
By a Single Commis-
sion, Board, Bureau
or Commissioner, - 30
States, 1 Territory*
California
Colorado
Delaware
Ge orgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mi chigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Porto Rico
By Courts, - 8
States, 1 Terri-
tory.
Alabama *
Arizona *
Kansas *
Louisiana *
New Hampshire *
New Mexico *
Tennessee *
Wyoming *
Alaska *
Otherwise, -
4 States, 1
Territory.
Connecticut—
by a single
Commissi oner
in and for
each of five
autonomous
districts.
Iowa
—
gener-
ally, by a
single Commis-
sioner; but
disputes are
decided by Ar-
bitrati on Com-
mittees.
New York
—
gen-
erally, by a
single Commis-
sioner; but
judicial ques-
tions are de-
cided by an In-
dustrial Board.
Khode Island-
generally, by
a single Com-
missioner; but
disputes are
decided by the
Courts.
Hawaii—by an
Industrial Ac-
cident Board in
and for each
county.
* The operations of the law or some of its provisions are to
some extent supervised or administered by a designated official
or officials.
Prepared by the Workmen's Compensation Publicity Bureau.
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